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Abstract

The emergence of the Piquetero Movement in Argentina during the 1990s and
early 2000s is the result of changing economic, political, and social processes at both the
macro

(national) and micro

presidency, Argentina began a
modernization.

(local) levels.

With

Carlos Menem’s

election to the

state-led project for national economic development and

The opening of the economy to foreign investment and the reductions of

state interference in the national economy transformed the national economy.

However,

the long-term economic and social costs of these reforms saw the growth of widespread
unemployment among the working class, a dismantling of state assistance networks, and
growing socio-economic inequality.
to

growing

representation.

dissatisfaction

with

Deteriorating socio-economic standards would lead
traditional

political

institutions

and

channels

of

Since these institutions were either unable or unwilling to address the

social costs of Menem’s economic development program, the lower classes, specifically
the urban poor and unemployed began to mobilize in protest.
Piquetero protests were thus born within the context of Argentina’s push for
economic development.

The macro trends of economic, political, and social change that

shaped the trajectory of the nation’s economic growth efforts would in turn impact the
development opportunities afforded to the Piquetero Movement.

The changes in macro

trends would thus result in the dismantling of state controls and networks that had
previously served to contain and/or subdue popular unrest. New social actors, such as the
urban poor and unemployed, were thus able to engaging in collective action for the first

time, challenging the state’s neoliberal economic model and offering an alternative form
of social and political representation.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Starting with the election of Carlos Menem in 1989, Argentina commenced a
decade long project of economic reform and modernization aimed at attracting foreign
investment and growing the national economy.

Over the course of the 1990s and

stretching into the new millennium, this push for economic growth based on free-market,
or neoliberal, principles would result in the transformation of Argentina’s economic,
political, and social landscape.

Deregulation, privatization, and the opening of

Argentina’s economy to foreign creditors and investment would spark tremendous
growth in the project’s initial years. The long-term effects of these reforms, however,
would eventually result in the weakening of the nation’s economic infrastructure and the
deterioration of the state’s social assistance networks and programs.
In response to these changes, the Argentine lower class soon began to mobilize in
response to what they saw as the widespread deterioration of socio-economic conditions
among the country’s poor and unemployed. They began to organize. They began to
protest. And they began to grow.

They called themselves piqueteros, and before long,

they had captured the attention of the Argentine public, the national government, and
international newspapers everywhere. Who were these people? Where did they come

from? What did they want? And how were they able to transform the nation’s poor and
unemployed masses into such a powerful force?
The Piquetero Movement (PQM) is a grass-roots movement consisting of “out of
work or poorly paid working class citizens, displeased with mass unemployment,

deficient salaries and federal economic policies” in Argentina.'

The PQM is not a single

entity but rather the conglomeration of numerous independent piquetero organizations
(PQOs) and assemblies scattered all over Argentina, with a large concentration of groups
located in the suburbs and surrounding barrios of Buenos Aires, Argentina’s capital city.
Piqueteros are known for their unique methods of protest, the piquete (or picket), from
which comes the moniker by which the movement is most widely known. Piquetes and
cortes de ruta (roadblocks) form the core part of the movement’s activities.

Individual

PQOs work both on their own and in cooperation with other PQOS to coordinate these
protests against the government’s economic policies and to petition for increased social
aid and assistance such as temporary job creation and the expansion of state social
services.

Why the Piqueteros?
I first learned of the piqueteros in one of my classes during my semester spent
abroad in Buenos Aires.

The class spent a portion of the semester studying some of the

social movements that had arisen following Argentina’s latest financial crisis in 2001.
The PQM was one of the groups that we studied.

When it came time to pick a topic to

investigate for my thesis, I decided that they were worth further investigation.

In my

initial research about the group, two aspects of the movement continued to reappear in
my readings that seemed to set the group apart from other social movement’s I had
studied.

' Trigona, Marie. 2002. “Argentine Social Movements: Taking Matters into Their Own
Hands.” Americas Program. November 7. http://americas.irc-online.org/am/1679

The movement’s first distinguishing feature dealt with the national and historical
context in which the movement appeared. The piqueteros emerged in a time of great
political and economic transition in Argentina’s history. Only a short time had passed
since the fall of the dictatorship that had so closely regulated Argentina’s political and
economic spheres during the 1980s. Having only recently adjusted to a newly restored
democracy, the country soon began pursuing a swift transition in its economic
development strategies.

The piquetero movement appeared in the midst of these key

changes and in many ways appeared a product of the instability they produced.
The role that this period of economic change and development played in the
PQM’s creation stuck as a particularly important aspect that distinguished the movement

from other Latin American social movements (SMs). Looking at the historical, political,
and economic forces that produced the PQM, I believe one can see a deviation from
previous patterns of Latin American SMs. History seems to suggest a series of recurring
causes that have often spawned SMs within Latin American nations such as: struggles
over land distribution, ethnic tensions, dictatorships, transitions to democracy, and
organized labor movement struggles to name a few.

The root of these strains lies in the

political, economic, and social imbalances that many Latin American nations have had to

deal with over the past century.

The PQ struggle, however, takes place within the context

of a Latin American nation trying to foster its own economic production, development,

and strength in the global market. The PQM was not spawned in response to any of the
other strains I listed above, but rather by the nation’s adoption of neoliberal economic
policies and development strategies. Considering that other Latin American countries
such as Brazil and Chile have utilized many of these same strategies with the same

purpose in mind and to certain success, it seems worth investigating why Argentina’s
efforts towards economic modernization would produce such a negative popular
response.
The second aspect was a matter of how the urban poor of Argentina had managed
to mount such a massive campaign considering their socio-economic context.
Considering the socio-economic status of its members, the resources (or lack of) these

members possessed, and their lack of representation in traditional institutions of power, it
is interesting that a movement such as the PQM was able to mobilize, grow, and

negotiate with the government on the scale and with the effectiveness that it did. The
PQM thus constitutes a group that seems to dispel the myth of the powerless atomized
poor, a movement that despite its members’ exclusion from elite institutions was able to
mount a large-scale opposition movement to those institutions. How was the PQM able to
accomplish these things? And furthermore, what (if any) were the connections between
the PQM’s ability to mobilize and the nation’s larger political, social, and economic
context during this time?
The PQM thus offers us a unique example of SM mobilization.

First it presents a

new SM context, that of Argentina in its push for economic development, and secondly,
new actors involved in collective action, that is the urban peasantry of Buenos Aires that
composed the PQM.

Considering these two distinguishing features, the PQM presents a

case in which our understanding of the mechanisms that facilitate SM formation and the
contexts in which these mechanisms operate might be challenged or, at a minimum,
enlarged. It is therefore the goal of this thesis to investigate the interplay between these

two processes and the extent to which the PQM might further inform our
conceptualization of SM formation.

Research Methodology

My research is thus concerned with two main ideas: 1) Investigating the

connection between Argentina’s economic development efforts in its role as a facilitator
for the PQM’s creation and, 2) determining how the PQM took shape: its beginnings, its
growth, its organization, and the mechanisms that facilitate these processes.

In order to

answer these questions I will have to establish a means by which I can break down these

two processes and understand how the former affected the latter. In this investigation I
have chosen to take a theoretical approach in addressing these two processes.

The

method by which IJ will address my main research questions will thus depend upon the
theories and frames I use to explain and analyze the PQM’s national context and
development mechanisms.

In regards to establishing these theoretical tools, I am greatly

indebted to the work of sociologists Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald
(MM&Z).

Their work was invaluable in my research in that they established a series of

theoretical categories and frames that address the political, ideological, and
developmental mechanisms involved in SM creation.

In this investigation I rely heavily

upon their theoretical tools in order to address the forces, actors, and institutions that

were in play in the case of the PQM.

Structure of the Thesis
The body of my analysis will thus deal with the application of MM&Z’s
theoretical frames to the case of the PQM.

This will first necessitate a detailed

explanation of the theories and ideas that underlie MM&Z’s framework of social
movement analysis, a task I will undertake in Chapter 2. These theoretical perspectives

will form the basis of my analysis of my two main research topics as well as dictate the
details of the PQ story that I will focus on in more specifically in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 3 will address the issue of the PQM’s national context.

This will entail a

discussion of Argentina’s political and economic climate during the 1990s and 2000s and
the impact they had on Argentine society at large. Based on my analysis of these
processes I turn my attention to how these developments are connected with the creation
and growth of the PQM. Chapter 4 will consequently focus on the mechanisms that
facilitated the PQM’s organization, growth, and development in reference to MM&Z’s
theoretical categories. This analysis will focus specifically on the events that impacted
the PQM’s inter-organizational development and the mechanisms that made its growth
possible.

Chapter 3 will thus adopt a broad lens in order to place the PQM within a

social, political, and economic context, while Chapter 4, in contrast, will emphasize the
micro-level processes that shaped the movement on the ground.

Ever since its beginnings, the PQM has been the topic of many scholarly articles
and a topic of discussion among academics from a variety of fields. Much research has
been done concerning various facets of the PQ story, but few have tried to address the
movement as a whole in a way that emphasizes the relationship between the macro and

micro level processes that contributed to its creation and growth.

What I hope to

accomplish over the course of this research project is to discuss how political, economic,
and social processes on both these levels played a part in shaping the PQM.

To do so

will inevitably mean that my analysis will take at times a very broad lens; while at others

a more detail-specific approach will be appropriated. No social movement is ever the
product of any single process or change, either micro or macro, but rather the intersection
of various political, economic, and social processes at both levels. Thus to cast the PQ

story in terms of any single discipline or level of analysis avoids or ignores the various
other factors that shaped the PQM’s development and the external context with which it
had to interact. For this reason, the goal of this thesis is not to explore any one aspect of
the PQM in detail, but to unify various levels and perspectives of SM analysis in order to
create a fuller picture of the PQM story and of the forces, institutions, and actors that are
often involved in SM mobilization.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL

PERSPECTIVES

In the previous chapter I outlined two specific research topics that this paper will
investigate. In this chapter I plan to explore the various theoretical models I will use in
order to address those questions. The purpose of providing a basic overview of social
movement theory is that by understanding the theoretical concepts that social scientists
have often used to understand SM mobilization, I will have a better idea of how to
approach the birth and development of the PQM.

The method by which I will answer my

original research questions is thus, dependent on the theoretical framework I will form in
this chapter.
Social movement theory is an exercise in trying to understand the various
mechanisms that spur individuals to protest, the context in which protests arise, and the
organizations, methods, and frames that these individuals utilize in order to achieve their
goals. Over the course of time, numerous theories and models have been suggested to
explain why and how social movements form. It is outside the scope of this investigation
to describe in full the numerous theories and models that have been formulated to explain
the mobilization and development of social movements. However, in this chapter I hope
to provide a brief sketch of some of the main schools of thought that first framed much of
theorists’ understanding about SM mobilization. These brief outlines will highlight each
model’s main arguments as well as the relevant criticisms and shortcomings of each
approach.
Like the old cliché concerning every snowflake, every social movement is
different and thus presents a unique set of theoretical challenges.

One soon finds that no

single model or theory explains perfectly and that the process of trying to understand the
multitude of experiences and structures within any certain group is ultimately one of
patching together various facets of one theory with another.

By understanding the

various strengths and weaknesses of certain models, I will have a platform from which I

can synthesize a final theoretical framework. Dissecting social phenomenon as complex
and multi-faceted as large-scale SM mobilization inevitably forces a researcher to limit
and prioritize the scope of his/her investigation. The framework established in this
chapter will thus be useful to this researcher in that it will help distinguish the
mechanisms, behaviors, and structures within the piquetero movement that necessitate
further investigation and analysis in order to answer my original questions.

2.1 Origins and Opportunity Structures

In this section J argue that SM creation is largely a result of broad social,
economic, and political processes over which the average individual has little or no
control. Changes in these processes are important because they produce two effects.
First, they create the points of contention that move people to consider collective action
(they create the reasons for which individuals are unhappy). Secondly, they shape the
environment (political, social, and economic) with which potential protesters have to
interact and contend. These larger processes thus not only produce the reason for
collective action (grievances) but also shape the larger regional/national contexts that can
actively encourage or discourage collective action. This is not to say that social
movement are an inevitable result of certain political, economic, or social circumstances,

but to demonstrate how a SM’s growth (and its later development, which I will address in

the next section) is influenced by a congruence of other external processes apart from the
SM itself.

Strain Theory

Structural strain theory (or grievance theory), an SM model proposed by early
social theorists such as Neil Smelser, William Kornhauser, Ralph Turner, and Lewis
Killian, suggests that social movements are sparked as a result of stresses placed on an a
social system.” These stresses would then result in undesirable effects for a certain

portion of the population. If these grievances were of a sufficient magnitude, individuals
would then be moved to action in order to change their situation. Furthermore, if these

strains adversely affected a sufficient amount of people, individuals would then band
together in larger numbers in mutual self-interest — thus sparking the movement.

Strain

theory is an important idea in SM theory in that it establishes the importance of the
shared grievance as the cornerstone upon which any social movement is built. Without
points of contention, no one has any reason to protest. Though it seems to be a rather
obvious observation it is nonetheless a very important one. Many factors that shape the
later mobilization and goals of a social movement stem from how its constituents first
identify and understand those strains that first motivated them to collective action. This
idea of structural stress is an important building block in forming a theoretical approach
to SM analysis.
However, structural strain theory only offers a very narrow perspective of SM

origins. For starters, strain theory places the individual as the most important unit within

* Hall, Melvin F. Poor People's Social Movement Organizations: The Goal Is to Win.

Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995, 3.
10

aSM.

This idea owes much to the research done by Mancur Olson, an economist who

tried to explain SMs in economic terms in which individual actors become the focus of
analysis.” While Olson’s idea certainly has merit, when incorporated into the calculus of
strain theory its hyper focus on the role of the individual only serves to limit the model’s
ability to explain SM behavior on a larger and more complex scale. According to strain
theory, we cannot think of SMs as a unified body but rather a collection of individual
actors whose decisions are made independent from organizing structures and according to
a purely economic, cost-benefit analysis. Groups, organizations, and other collective
networks that SMs often utilize as decision making bodies and means to coordinate
further collective action are left as unexplained phenomenon. The idea that accumulated

structural strain is the sole factor behind SM creation also creates several other theoretical
problems. According to Tarrow, system strain is present in all societies, yet all societies
are not in a constant state of social upheaval. Strain theory is ambiguous about how
much stress is actually necessary in order to produce a SM. There is no benchmark laid
out by which one can judge structural strains and/or at what point these strains might
produce a SM. Furthermore it offers no explanation as to the number of people who must
be affected in order to push those persons from inaction to action. These thresholds are
left ambiguous.
As aresult, strain theory does not offer a very satisfying explanation as to why

SMs form at a given time. However, what it does do is provide us with two crucial
theoretical ideas. First, that social strain (and the grievances it produces) is a necessary
precondition for SMs to form. A logical assumption considering that without any point

> Tarrow, Sidney G. Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and

Politics. Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1994,14.
11

of contention there would be no reason to mobilize. And secondly, social strain is not
itself a sufficient cause for a SM to appear. If that is the case, what variable(s) are
missing?

Ifthe sheer force of social strain is not sufficient to produce collective action

on its own, what additional factors must be taken into account?

Strain theory presents a very simple idea of cause and effect: when a sufficient
amount of social strain negatively impacts a portion of the population, people will
inevitably react. This point of view, however, says nothing as to the origin of these
stresses, the context in which these stresses occur, or how one’s context might possibly
discourage or encourage collective action. Social movements do not occur within
political, economic, and social vacuums and it is reasonable to assume that varying
circumstances in regards to these three factors would have some sort of influence on the
likelihood of mobilization.

SM context and Political opportunities

Political opportunity theory offers a few clues as to how this process works.

The

theory of “political opportunity structures” attempts to understand how political

circumstances can influence SM mobilization. Douglas McAdam’s theory suggests that
“collective action is a function of the changes in the institutional structure or informal
power relations of a given national political system’.

In other words, the likelihood that

aggrieved individuals or groups would attempt to mobilize is directly related to the health

“McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds. Comparative perspectives
on social movements, political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural
framings. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge UP, 1996, 3.
12

and/or weakness of the current political state. Why might this be this be the case?
Mcadam’s theory suggests that: 1) Political weakness and change are recurring cycles
that are inherently present in any political system. Though the causes behind these times
of instability may vary (administration changes, transitions to democracy, shifts in

political ideology or policy, etc.), every political system regularly goes through periods in
which traditional political institutions are more vulnerable to disruption 2) SMs, will
more than likely be met with resistance from some section of the political establishment
since its end goal is to affect a change in the political status quo. For this reason SMs are
considered a form of “contentious politics”, an alternative means of engagement with the
political process for those who have been denied access to traditional structures and
organizations. 3) Alternative means of representation stand a better chance of achieving
their goals during periods in which resistance is diminished by political division,
disorganization, or change.
If McAdams’s analysis is correct, what does that then tell us about the interaction

between SMs and their political environment? For one, it suggests that the ability of
political actors and institutions to constrain or combat SM activity would have a large
influence on the success or failure of SM efforts, thus shaping SM strategies and
approaches (this idea I will address later in the chapter in regards to development
opportunities). But secondly, and more importantly in regards to the present discussion,
this model connects the cyclical processes of national politics to increased opportunities
for collective action. In other words, the implication of the political opportunity theory
model suggests that we can make correlations between external processes (such as cycles
of political instability) and the likelihood of mobilization. This does not necessarily mean

13

that there is a direct correlation between the two processes, but it does imply that larger
external forces can and do play a role in creating an environment that is more conducive
to SM mobilization.

Using this same logic, I argue that one could expand the list of external factors that affect
the context of SM mobilization to economic and social processes as well. This is in fact,
exactly the approach I will take in subsequent chapters.

Strain theory has proven to be an insufficient cause for SM mobilization on its
own. But by incorporating larger cultural, economic, and political processes

as potential

variables in the equation of SM creation, one better understands the context and
environment that first produced those strains and the SMs that are subsequently created to
address them. SMs, are therefore just as much a product of their individuals contexts.
By better understanding these contexts, we then have a better understanding of its later

development. It is for this reason that I believe an examination of these external factors is
important because they not only create the conditions for possible SM mobilization, but
also continue to have implications on a given SM’s development as they continue to
change and reshape the political, economic, and cultural landscape with which the
growing SM will have to engage.

2.2 Development and Mobilizing Structures
If these macro/external processes are the source of SM grievances and provide an

opportune environment for SM creation, how then do aggrieved individuals go about
constructing a cohesive movement?

I have already discussed how structural strain alone

14

has proven insufficient to explain how SMs actually crystallize. I have also tried to
clarify how external processes might encourage or discourage SM mobilization
considering the current contexts and affects on potential participants. Finally, in this
section I will discuss the various methods and models by which the aggrieved are able to
take advantage of the opportunities afforded them and begin building a movement (as
opposed to isolated, disparate pockets of protests). These methods are what MM&Z have
called mobilizing structures. Mobilizing structures are defined as “those collective
vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in
collective action...this focuses on the meso-level groups, organizations, and informal

networks that comprise the collective building blocks of social movements.”

While

external processes may present various opportunities for SM mobilization, these factors
are inconsequential if aggrieved individuals are unable to capitalize on these

opportunities. SM development is concerned with the mechanisms by which SMs are
able to band together as a cohesive unit, utilizing what resources are available to them,
and engage in collective action within the context of these external processes. Once
again, I will rely heavily on the theories laid out by MM&Z

and will be using their

concepts of political opportunity/restraint, resource mobilization, and collective frames in
my analysis of the developmental process.

Political Opportunities and Constraints

Earlier I hinted at how political opportunity theory might serve as a useful tool in
understanding SM development in addition to how external processes shape SM

> MMZ, 3.
15

mobilization.

Cycles of political weakness and institutional change can be viewed in two

distinct ways, depending on the period of time by which it is constrained. If these cycles
are understood to be long-term processes, one could use opportunity theory to understand

the historical correlations between political changes and SM creation. And example of
this point of view might suggest that the political instability of Latin American
dictatorships and their transition to democracy constituted a period of political weakness
that created an opportunity for increased SM creation, for instance. However, if the
cycles of political weakness are considered on a smaller scale, this theory could explain
how the policy decisions of a specific administration or the health or weakness within
certain political parties/institutions might affect SM strategies and/or behaviors. This
first point of view I have already discussed. The second however, bears further
investigation.

According to McAdams, SMs must learn to formulate strategies based on the
political opportunities that they are afforded by the present political system as well
restraints to which they are submitted. As I have previously mentioned, political
opportunity is a result of division and/or change within traditional political institutions
that weaken its ability to take decisive action. These institutions are thus more susceptible
to challenges from alternative political institutions such as social movements. Protesters
may be encouraged to continue and/or increase the intensity of collective action based on

perceived political indecisiveness. However, depending on the context and nature of SM
activity, indecisiveness may give way to direct conflict. More often than not, political

opportunity is tempered by political constraints. These constraints can take various
forms; both indirect measures (restrictive bargaining conditions, limiting of SM activities,

exclusion from political debate) and direct (repression, police violence, etc.). Regardless
of its manifestations, political restraints constitute an attempt by the political elite to exert
and maintain control over SM activities. SMs must thus adapt their strategies to these
constraints by either agreeing to work within their limits or transgressing these lines and
dealing with the consequences.

The interaction between these various restrictions and

opportunities form the basis of the relationship between SMs and the state. How these
opportunities and restraints are created thus seems a pertinent issue to address in my
evaluation of the PQM.

Resource Mobilization

Thus far, we have established structural strain and political opportunity as
important mediating factors in the process of SM development both on macro and micro
levels. Changes in political, economic, and social dynamics produce structural strains

that may eventually move individuals to action in order to respond to these perceived
grievances. However, even if given the opportunities, how do individuals go about
building, organizing, and coordinating a SM?

Organizational structures must be formed

(things that strain theory did/ or could not explain) and resources must be found/recruited,
mobilized, and used in order to further the movement’s work (a process political
opportunity theory did account for). For this reason, McCarthy, Zald, and John Wilson

proposed the resource mobilization model as a way to explain how SM’s mobilized and
developed. According to this theory, discontent caused by strain would remain dormant
until resources were made available to the protesters, thus providing an opportunity for
mobilization. McCarthy, Zald, and Wlilson assumed that a SM could not sustain itself
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without capital of some sort by which the movement could “finance” its activities. But
where would these resources come from? Would those who participated in the
movement supply these resources or would they have to look for resources from outside
the movement? Implicit in McArthy, Zald, and Wilson’s model is the assumption that the
aggrieved are unable to affect change on their own, for why would they protest if they
already had the power to change their situation? This idea certainly fits with Tarrow’s
idea of SM as expressions of “contentious politics”, providing a means of political
engagement for those whom access to the political arena had been restricted.

This being

the case, McCarthy, Zald, and Wilson said that SM resources would most likely originate

from outside the aggrieved group, provided by what he calls “insiders”, elite individuals
who offer the movement necessary support and resources that they might not otherwise
have access to. This point of the theory, however, becomes problematic since it implies

that a SM cannot sustain itself without assistance from the elite.
Nevertheless, establishing and utilizing resources, both human and material, is an
unavoidable hurdle in the process of SM development.

In the case of the piqueteros, a

movement composed of unemployed workers and the traditional urban peasantry, this
process presents an especially difficult challenge since many of its members lack even

the most basic of necessities such as food, lodging, and steady employment.

The

piqueteros’ economic, class, and social standing does not afford the group the material
resources, social networks, and other pre-existing connecting structures that are often
available to other SMs.

Instead, it tends to isolate individuals from one another and has

often meant that the lower classes were easily coerced and co-opted by politicians and

political parties in exchange for basic social assistance. How were the piqueteros able to
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overcome these obstacles? How were they able to establish the necessary networks,
organizing structures, and materials considering their lowly position? These are
questions I hope to investigate more thoroughly in subsequent chapters.

Collective Framing

If the combination of political opportunities and mobilizing structures affords
groups a certain structural potential for action, they remain, in the absence of one other
factor, insufficient to account for collective action. Mediating between opportunity,
organization, and action are the shared meanings and definitions that people bring to
their situation. At a minimum, people need to feel both aggrieved about some aspect of
their lives and optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem. Lacking
either one or both of these perceptions, it is highly unlikely that people will mobilize even
when afforded the opportunity to do so. Conditioning the presence or absence of these
perceptions is that complex of social psychological dynamics — collective attribution,
social construction that David Snow and the various of his colleagues have referred to as
;

framing processes.

6

Collective framing is the process of formulating SM group identity. As MM&Z
have just argued this process is an essential part of SM mobilization.

It involves the

definition of shared grievances and promoting the idea among participants that collective
action offers them an effective mechanism to affect change. If a SM fails to be able to
reach a consensus concerning “What are our grievances” and “Can we actually do

° MMZ, 5.
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anything to change our circumstances,” it is unlikely that they will be able to launch a

very convincing or successful campaign. This section will address the issue of collective
framing by exploring several key questions related to this process of group identity: How
does the nature of SM grievances affect SM framing? And how might the process of

identity building affect further SM behavior? These processes are important because they
help define SM protesters as a group, forging a common bond based on shared
circumstance and common grievances. These questions are also especially relevant to the
formation of the PQ as a SM considering their rather unique make-up and approach to
organization.

Strain Origins and the Building of Collective Identity

As I will argue later, the piqueteros distinguish themselves from previous social

movements in LA, not because of the mechanisms by which they mobilized and
developed, but because of the nature of their grievances. The “nature” of a movement’s
grievances however, is ultimately subjective to its point of view. The neoliberal
economic policies that were implemented in Argentina during the 1990s negatively

impacted a large portion of the population, the middle and lower classes especially, and
produced the strains that first moved the piqueteros to action. How the piqueteros then
collectively understood and interpreted these strains depended would have a large effect
on the way in which the group would frame its struggle within the context of Argentina’s

changing economy.

And as I will show later, the identities and frames that were created

as a result of this unique point of view would impact future PQ actions, methods of
protest, and goals.
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Why Frames Matter

This correlation between “types” of strains and collective framing can be seen
throughout LA history. Since their independence, LA nations have had to deal with
several recurring categories of social strain. Among some of the most frequent have been
struggles over land distribution, ethnic tensions, democratic transitions, and labor
struggles. Each different situation presented a different series of strains, and as a result,

the collective identities and the responses from SMOs that formed in order to address
these strains took different shapes. SMs protesting land distribution might form
collective identities that emphasize common class identities among its members and call
for an equal distribution of resources. Political repression of middle- class intellectuals
might spark a movement emphasizing freedom of the press or a right to free speech.

The

identities such a movement might form and the measures it might employ to reach its
goals would thus differ greatly from a group that was working to promote the rights of

indigenous peoples. As a student of history, one can see that every different situation
required a different set of ideological tools and methodologies. This fact is no less true in
the case of the piqueteros.

Exploring how the piqueteros went about solving these issues

of identity is thus a central point of interest in my investigation; the last piece of the SM
development puzzle.

Conclusion
What do these theoretical models have to tell us about the PQ movement?

In this

chapter, I have tried to outline the basic concepts behind these models and the questions

they force us to ask about the processes involved with SM mobilization and development.
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By dividing SM creation into the two process of origins and development, I have created
a way to examine both the macro-level process that shape the context of SM creation as

well as the internal structures that shape SM organization and behaviors.

In the following

two chapters I hope to investigate in more detail how these two processes played out in
the creation and development of the PQM.

First, I will explore the external forces that

reshaped Argentina’s political, economic, and social landscape during the 1990s and
early 2000s.

I must then explain how these forces produced the strain that moved the

piqueteros to first mobilize and how they continued to affect and influence PQ strategies
and actions. Secondly, I will explore how the PQs took advantage of these external
processes in order to fuel the internal mechanisms that allowed them to organize and
mobilize effectively. MM&Z’s concepts of political opportunities and restraints, resource
mobilization, and collective framing will again be useful organizational and thematic
tools in this effort.
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Chapter 3: Argentina From a Distance:

Macro Processes in Political, Economic, and Social Change

This chapter will attempt to provide the social, political, and economic
background necessary to understand the historical circumstances that produced rise of the

piquetero movement. This will consist of first examining the shifts in national economic
policies that shaped the Argentine economy during the 1990s up through the turn of the
millennium. These changes in the national economy had important consequences for
Argentine society since they shaped the economic opportunities and social resources that

were available to society at that time. Secondly, I will examine shifts in the political
landscape that might affect the relationships between the state and social actors.
And thirdly, this chapter will also conclude with a discussion of the social costs these
economic reforms generated and how Argentine society was affected by these shifts.
Also, in addition to investigating the historical processes that shaped Argentina during
this time, I will try to address how these processes color our understanding of the smaller
processes that drove PQM mobilization.

3.1 Neoliberal Development and Argentine Economic Transformation in the 1990s
Argentina began the 1990s on rocky ground. Only a few years removed from the
collapse of a seven year-long military dictatorship, newly elected president Carlos
Menem was faced with a country paralyzed by astronomical inflation and political
instability. Menem’s predecessor, Carlos Alfonsin, had done his best in overseeing the
country‘s transition to democracy and attempting to solve many of Argentina’s economic
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inefficiencies. However, like many other Latin American countries that were attempting

to jumpstart their domestic economies during the 1980s, efforts at an economic
turnaround produced poor results. As Alfonsin neared the end of his term as president in
1989 economic inflation hovered around 6,000%.’

As economic conditions had worsened over the course of the 1980s, Alfonsin’s
Radical government had slowly crumbled under the weight of a poor economy and public
unrest. In large part due to the Radical government’s poor economic performance, Carlos
Menem was able to win the presidency on the Peronist ticket with 49.0 percent of the
vote.® In the campaign preceding the presidential election, Menem had promised huge
salary increases and a “revolucion productiva” in the populist-styled politics typical of
old-school Peronism. However, upon assuming the presidency he soon abandoned the
populist overtones and, instead, began talking of sweeping market-based reforms,
changes he described would be akin to “major surgery without anesthesia”.”
In times past, such an abrupt change in tune might have sparked immediate public
outcry. However, Menem was able to implement his new economic plan with little to no
resistance. Why was that the case? For starters, the severity of the country’s economic
problems necessitated aggressive and swift action in order to stave off further economic
backsliding.

Secondly, labor union protests were minimal.

In the past, times of

economic hardship had frequently meant eventual military intervention. Thus for the sake
of political stability much of organized labor seemed hesitant to rock the political boat for
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Print.

* Romero, Luis Alberto. A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century. University
Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State UP, 2002, 288.
7 Romero, 289.

24

fear that another such intervention might occur. And lastly, by capitalizing on the
unpopularity of the previous administration, the Peronist party was able, for the first time
since the dictatorship, to solidify their political presence and place it firmly back in the
political driving seat. These factors, the national sense of urgency in regards to solving
the country’s economic problems, the relative assurance of steady business-labor

relations, and a cooperative Peronist bloque in the national legislature, meant that Menem
was able to accomplish what Alfonsin could not — the free-market reformation of the

Argentine economy.
At the end of WWII, Argentina was poised as one of world’s up and coming
economic powerhouses.

As a result of its abundant and varied natural resources

Argentina had greatly benefited from the exportation of primary products such as

agricultural goods and livestock during the first half of the century and through the end of
the Second World War. At this point in history, national leaders were searching for ways
to insulate the national economy from the fluctuating market for primary goods and
modernize the economy.

As a result, they began looking for ways to increase the

country’s industrial capabilities through investment in modern manufacturing
technologies and heavy infrastructure. Thus, in order to protect its fledgling
manufacturing sector, government economic policy consistently insulated domestic
producers from influxes of imported goods through tariffs and other trade barriers.

However, instead of boosting economic production, these policies only served to isolate
Argentina from international markets and healthy competition over the course of the
following decades.

Argentina thus increasingly looked inward towards home markets in

order to prop up its inefficient, state-owned manufacturers. As a consequence, great
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economic and political strain was created within the federal government as they
attempted to maintain the nation’s finances as well as political legitimacy. In times of
financial hardships, these two responsibilities often came into direct conflict with each
other since necessary economic cutbacks would inevitably be detrimental to a regime’s

political image and public support. It is this inherent dichotomy that was ultimately
behind the downfall of numerous regimes in the decades following WWII.
Menem’s answer to this paradox was to extract the state from the national
economy via neoliberal reforms such as those promoted by Washington-based credit

organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WorldBank.

The

theory was that by decreasing state intervention and opening Argentine markets to
international investment and competition, previous inefficiencies would be corrected by
the market and foreign investment capital could be used to jumpstart domestic
production. This would, in turn, increase economic growth thereby attracting even more
foreign investment yielding further economic growth, creating an upward spiral of
economic growth and development.

Economic reforms centered around three major

objectives: eliminating state intervention in economy through the privatization of
inefficient state-owned companies, enacting austerity measures aimed at decreasing
government spending to the level of the state’s real fiscal resources, and the opening of
Argentine markets to international markets through the lowering of trade barriers and

tariffs.'°
The Menem administration quickly committed to achieving these three
benchmarks.

Taking advantage of the Peronist majority in the legislature, two key laws

'0 Romero, 286.
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were passed that facilitated a speedy restructuring of the economy.

The Law of

Economic Emergency “suspended all kinds of subsidies, special privileges, and

promotional schemes and authorized the laying off of public employees. The Law of
State Reform declared the necessity of privatizing a long list of state-owned companies
and gave the president broad powers to choose the specific manner of achieving this.”
In 1990 as proof of their commitment to achieving these goals, the government rapidly
auctioned off the national telephone company, Entel, the national airlines, Aerolineas

Argentinas, and promised to privatize other state holdings such as electricity, coal,
natural gas, oil, and subways as soon as possible.'* Between 1989 and 1993, over
302,000 public sector jobs at the local, regional, and national levels were eliminated.'°
These cuts in government subsidies and market protections, as well as payroll reductions
and decreased social spending, helped bring runaway inflation under control. Inflation
had been cut from 4,900 percent in 1989 to 4 percent by 1994.'* Regional and
international trade was encouraged by the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers.
The most noticeable example of this was the creation of MERCOSUR (the “Common
Market of the South”) in 1991. MERCOSUR was envisioned as a free-trade zone
between the member countries of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay that would
foster regional trade through the removal of trade barriers and the free dissemination of
information and production technology.

Another early program aimed at spurring

economic growth and an influx of capital was a ‘currency board’ that established a one-
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to-one exchange rate between the Argentine peso and the U.S. dollar. The board was
created to inspire confidence in the Argentine currency and communicate to international
creditors and investors the country’s commitment to the free market.
The majority of these reforms were put in place within the first few years of
Menem’s administration. And for their time they produced impressive results. From
1991 until 1994 the Argentine economy grew at a rate of 7 percent. However, the
apparent success as reflected by growth in GDP disguised some of darker side effects of

Argentina’s economic reformation. The privatization of state-owned companies was
poorly conducted and with little state oversight.'° As a result, auctions were not carried
out in a way that encouraged competition but, more often than not, were used to

distribute favors to loyal political constituents. The administration’s insistence on
expedience often meant that corrupt business deals were over-looked for the sake of the
appearance of economic liberalization. Unemployment grew from 6.5 percent in 1991 to
12.2 percent in 1994 due to the elimination of jobs in the public sphere as well as
downsizing in many privately held companies.'® The currency board’s one-to-one ratio
also led to the “dollarization’” of the Argentine economy and the return of inflation as

Argentine goods were overvalued on international markets, making export growth harder
to maintain. Additionally, the opening of Argentina’s money markets to large scale
foreign investment left the economy vulnerable to speculators who could move large
sums of money in and out of the country with relative ease. In fact, that was exactly what

happened in December of 1994 as an economic crisis in Mexican money markets led to
the limiting of credit available to many Latin American countries. Between December
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1994 and March 1995 more than $4 billion dollars in deposits had been moved from
Argentina.'’ Though the government was able to negotiate temporary loans to stave off a
national crisis, the Argentine economy would never fully recover. The honeymoon period

of those first few years was over as GDP growth in 1995-1996 was reduced to 5
percent.'® By 1997 the country was officially in a recession, exaggerated by the
devaluation of the Brazilian real, and the subsequent flood of cheap Brazilian imports
that entered the country. Argentine goods, still valued at prices pegged to the American

dollar could not compete and still Menem’s economic advisors refused to devalue the
peso for fear of encouraging more capital flight from the country. By 1999, policies that
had at first brought a strong economic recovery had left Argentina with an economy

whose foundations were slowly crumbling as unemployment soared, inflation returned,
and overvalued goods could no longer compete on international markets.

Economic Crisis of 2001
Menem’s economic minister, Domingo Cavallo, had built his strategy for
economic development around the central pillar of his “convertibility plan”, pegging the
Argentine peso at a one-to-one ratio with the American dollar. This gesture was designed
to stimulate investment by assuring foreign creditors that Argentina was committed to
economic reform and would honor its debts. Soon after it was put in effect, the “plan”

produced a large ingression of capital that produced a growth in federal reserves,
available credit, and domestic production’’ Argentina’s GDP would subsequently grow at
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an annual rate of 6% from 1989 to 1997, an overall growth of 51%.”
Unfortunately, this growth could not be maintained.

debilitate the Argentine economy.

Three factors would slowly

First, easy availability of foreign credit meant that

Argentina’s external debt grew rapidly, rising from US $60 billion in 1991 to US $95
billion by the end of 1994.7! Second, the American dollar gained strength as the decade
progressed.

Since the price of Argentine goods and services were still tied to the dollar,

Argentine exports were now priced above their actual value. The resulting inflation
produced the gradual stagnation of export growth and a negative trade balance that
allowed cheap foreign imports to flood the Argentine market. Third, currency crises in
other areas of the global market such as such as Mexico (1994), Southeast Asia (1997),
Russia (1998) and Brazil (1999) cast doubt on Argentina’s ability to pay off its mounting
foreign debt (which had been financed in dollars, not pesos).”” All together, these events
spelled disaster for Argentina’s economic prospects, and by mid-1998 the economy was

officially in recession.
The recession only further exacerbated Argentina’s economic woes. The debt
crisis continued to compound, as additional loans were needed just in order to make
interests payments to creditors. Sharp drops in federal reserves further debilitated
government resources as foreign capital left the country.

The peso was theoretically still

valued at a one-to-one ratio with the dollar, yet in actuality it was worth far less. A
devaluation of the peso seemed inevitable, yet Menem refused for fear of further capital
flight, not to mention the fact that his successor, de la Rua, was scheduled to take office
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soon after.

The new president would thus, have to pay for the mistakes of his predecessor. In

the year and a half following de la Rua’s election, Argentina’s economic strains reached
their breaking point. Between 1998 and 2001 gross domestic production contracted by
9%, unemployment grew from 12.4% to 18.3%, investments fell by 31%, and the total

exterior debt grew from $126 billion dollars to 165 billion.” By this point in time
foreign assistance had all but disappeared. The IMF, unhappy with the state’s inability to
reign in its public deficits, refused requests for further assistance.

By mid-2001, investors

had lost all confidence in the peso. Bank runs (on the part of both international investors
and worried Argentine citizens) depleted the reserves of the Central Bank to just under $5
billion by December of that year compared to $15 billion of the preceding October and
the $30 billion in reserves in1999.™ In response to one such run in late November,
President de la Rua ordered that all bank deposits be frozen, what was referred to as the
corralito.”>
On December 19, 2001, food riots broke out in the capital city of Buenos Aires

leaving 32 dead.”° The next evening, Deceber 20, thousands of lower and middle class
citizens took to the streets of the capital banging pots and pans together (an event now

known as the cacerolazo) in protest of the corralito. On December 21, President de la
Rua resigned amid continued riots and looting. Argentina was left in a political and
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economic vacuum as three other interim presidents resigned in the course of the few
weeks following de la Rua resignation. Adolfo Rodriguez Saa, the third of the interim
presidents, was forced to declare default on the countries national debt. Weeks later,

Rodriguez Saa was succeeded by Eduardo Duhalde, de la Rua’s opponent in the previous
presidential election.

Duhalde took immediate action to address the nation’s economic

turmoil by promptly abandoning the currency board and establishing additional
restrictions on imports and bank transactions in order to shore up national resources.
However, by the end of December the Argentine peso had lost 70% of its value and GDP
had contracted another 10.9%.’

3.2 Reformation Repercussions: A Changing Political Landscape

In terms of the larger political processes at play in Argentina during the 1990s and
early 2001, reform resulted in the gradual loss of trust in government institutions and a
search for alternative means of representation. In Menem’s first presidential campaign

platform, he had not only emphasized the importance of economic reform, but also a
return to honest government and an end to state corruption. Yet these goals for reducing

state corruption were not compatible with his administration’s practices.”* In the words of
one trade union official, “Nobody makes money by working.” ”’ Political favoritism
continued as usual since these practices allowed Menem to consolidate his political
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power and continue implementing reform legislation, despite campaign promises to clean
up corrupt government practices. Various scandals were uncovered during the course of
his administration involving the government auction of state companies as well as the
bribing of congressman.” °
Though Carlos Menem was effectively able to secure his reelection to the
presidency in 1995 (amending the nation’s constitution in order to do so), his
administration did not fare nearly as well in the latter half of the 1990s as it did in the
first. The economic dynamism that characterized his first term in office was largely
absent from the period of 1995-1999 due to the nation’s deteriorating economic
infrastructure and growing foreign debt. The enthusiasm with which his administration
had initially embraced the new economic model offered to them by organizations such as
the IMF and WorldBank had been a product of necessity. The previous president, Raul
Alfonsin, had left the national economy in shambles requiring swift action on the part of

the new administration. In order to attract foreign investment and stimulate production,
Menem immediately began redesigning Argentine economic policy around the IMF
supported neoliberal economic model, placing an emphasis on fiscal austerity and freemarket efficiency. The political will and leverage that was necessary to implement these
measures in such a short amount of time proceeded largely from the executive branch.

State funds and resources were often distributed to provincial governments and
politicians as a means of ensuring their political cooperation and support. Presidential
decrees were also largely used in policy implementation in order to circumvent the

national legislature and allow the president to swiftly address economic issues. However,
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such a strong leadership style left Menem increasingly isolated politically and his
political leverage dependent upon his ability to deliver political favors. As economic
growth slowed during the mid-1990s, state coffers began to run dry and Menem was no

longer able to sustain the patronage networks that had preserved the political and social
order to that point. As a result, his administration suffered a large loss of public and
political support in its final years as the economy continued to worsen.

Argentina’s political opposition took advantage of the administration’s waning
popularity by establishing the Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educacion (simply
known as “la Alianza”) in preparation for the 1997 congressional elections. La Alianza
was a political alliance between Argentina’s two largest opposition parties, the Radical
Party (UCR) and the FREPASO (Frente por un Pais Solidario).

Individually, these two

organizations had been unsuccessful over the past decade in their attempts to challenge
Menem’s Justialist Party (PJ, the modern-day representation of Argentina’s Peronist

party). Yet by joining forces under the banner of La Alianza, they were able to garner
close to 46% of the vote in mid-term congressional elections and effectively threaten the
Justicialist’s political dominance in the legislature. Though La Alianza did not publicly
disagree with Menem’s economic policies it was able to gain support by drawing
attention to existing social inequalities, unemployment, and government corruption.
Continuing with this strategy into the 1999 presidential election, !a Alianza succeeded in
electing its candidate, Fernando de la Rua, with 48.5% of the vote, 10% more than the

Peronist candidate Eduardo Duhalde.”!
De la Ruas Alianza administration inherited the growing naitonal debt and social
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unrest that that the previous administration’s policies had produced.

Yet, despite the

regime change they were unable to alter the course of the economy. Why? Firstly, the

FREPASO-UCR coalition had been forged on shaky ground from the start. Despite its
electoral success, the coalition lacked the legislative majority that would have been

necessary to attempt the in-depth reform necessary to produce any sort of national
economic recovery. Though the Peronist block was never unremittingly hostile towards
de la Rua’s administration, it was unenthusiastic towards proposed reforms and slow to
mobilize any support until the last moment.**

Furthermore, the resignation of Vice-

President Carlos Alvarez towards the end of 2002 seriously weakened the

administration’s political footing. Alvarez had been the FREPASO half of the Alianza’s
presidential ticket in 1999 and had been crucial in attracting voters from the left of the
political spectrum. As a result of his resignation, the remaining FREPASO members
abandoned la Alainza in March 2001.*? The administration’s political allies were thus
scattered and divided in one of its greatest times of need.

Crucial changes in the country’s economic infrastructure had also crippled any
chance the administration had for a swift recovery. Most of these changes have already
been discussed in detail, but it bears to reiterate several key macroeconomic factors. The
previous administration’s economic pillar, convertibility, had undermined the countries
ability to overcome its trade deficits. The currency board had provided the illusion of
stability to foreign investors while also crippling the growth of domestic exports. The
unregulated opening of the economy also left the nation’s money supply incredibly
vulnerable to the whims of international investment brokers who were able to move large
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amounts of money in and out of the country. The uncertain ebb and flow of these
investments prevented the state from being able to form any medium or long-term plan
for stable economic growth and left the economy overly exposed to market fluctuations.
Furthermore, austerity meant that the state was unable to help overcome the limitations of

the Argentine work force. Any long-term growth would be dependent on the nation’s

ability to retool its work force for a globalized economy through improved access to
education, social services, and advanced technology.**

The economy’s reliance upon

IMF bridge loans and international creditors prevented the state from this type of longterm social investment.

De la Ruia’s administration was thus politically immobilized as a result of the
country’s economic predicament — unable to spark economic growth due to its lack of
political capital and the limitations of the Argentine workforce, and unable to address the
social needs of the working class because of the poor economic performance and
mounting debt. De la Rua was thus found himself the captain of a sinking ship. As a
result of this vulnerable position, De la Rua resigned from the presidency soon after the
explosion of riots and protests in Buenos Aires during the December of 2001. His
previous opponent in the 1999 presidential election, the Peronist Eduardo Duhalde,
would succeed him weeks later.

3.3 Reformation Repercussion: The Social Costs of Economic Development
Economic reform not only had enormous consequences for the country’s political

landscape but also produced numerous socio-economic costs among the Argentina’s
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working class and, later (although to a lesser degree), among the Argentine middle class
as well as the economic slowdown of the late 1990s continued.

In this section, I will

address how the implementation of neoliberal reforms facilitated three specific
transformations: the state’s abandonment of its role as a guarantor of stable employment
and social services, the diminishing role of traditional state institutions, such as unions, as

methods of political and social representation, and the polarization of Argentine society

according to the economic and social opportunities afforded to different socio-economic
groups. By reshaping the landscape of the Argentine public’s economic, political, and
social opportunities, these processes would consequently facilitate the creation of a new
wave of national protests in which the PQM would play an important role. An
investigation as to how neoliberal reforms transformed Argentine society is thus
important because these macro processes would'subsequently set the stage for later PQ
mobilization.

In Argentina, access to employment, along with other public goods such as
education, health care, and social security, was viewed as a public right that should be
available to all citizens. This idea can be traced back to the state-labor relations that were
forged during the presidency of Juan Peron in the 1940s. Peron’s populist political

practices created strong links between the national government and Argentina’s working
class. His incorporation of the Confederacion General del Trabajo (CGT, Argentina’s

national workers union) into the political structure of the national government during his
times in office serves as evidence of the close relations he fostered between the state and
the Argentine labor movement. Peron’s political career was consequently built on the
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back of the Argentine worker and his political power was dependent upon keeping this

sector of society happy as a consequence.

His wide base of popular support among the

Argentina’s workers thus stemmed from his efforts at expanding job opportunities
(through the construction of industrial plants and factories), increasing salaries and
working conditions, and expanding the networks of social services available to the
working class. These populist political practices became the defining characteristic of the
Peronist party.
This political strategy (targeting the working class as one’s political support base)
was consequently adopted and utilized by subsequent Peronist administrations throughout
the twentieth century, to more or less to the same effect.

As a consequence, the

Argentine working class had come to expect the national government to assume the
responsibilities of ensuring opportunities for employment as well as other social service
programs. And it was upon this political platform that Carlos Menem had launched his
campaign for the presidency in 1989. However, once in office, Menem changed his tune
drastically. According to his economic advisors, the social responsibilities the state had
assumed placed an unnecessary burden on state resources, resulting in a growing national
deficit and an inefficient industrial sector,

Consequently, the best way to improve

Argentina’s long-term prospects for prosperity would be through unhindered economic

development; development that could only be achieved through an emphasis on
efficiency and decreasing state interference in the economy.
Reaching these goals, however, ultimately meant a drastic reduction of the labor
force. Pay roll cuts across government agencies and the auction of state-owned
companies helped cut government expenses. Newly privatized companies often then
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faced additional downsizing of their work force in order to cut overhead, and those who
still had jobs suffered sharp drops in real wages.*°

The state’s assurance of employment

was thus sacrificed for the sake of economic growth and exchanged for the principles of
labor “flexibility” that these free-market policies necessitated. The social contract to
which the Peronist party had committed itself (at least in theory if not in practice) was

broken as a consequence.

In the spirit of free-market capitalism and in an effort to

control state spending and reduce the national debt, the state began dissolving its
networks of social assistance programs, privatizing state-companies, and subjecting the
national economy to the external forces of the global market.

The implications of this

decision would have far reaching effects, not only in terms of the nation’s economy, but
also in terms of the state-labor dynamics.

One additional consequence of Menem’s economic reform was thus the
diminishing importance of institutions that had previously facilitated state-society
interactions. Organizations that had traditionally served as representatives for the
Argentine labor movement, such as the CGT, became seen as increasingly irrelevant.
Argentine unions had traditionally been an important mechanism by which the state was
able to maintain the balance between capitalist and labor interests. These syndicates were
integrated into the national political system and served as conduits through which
workers could voice their needs, concerns, and demands to the government.

During the

Alfonsin era, leaders of the CGT organized massive strikes in protest of the country’s

poor economic condition that greatly destabilized that president’s administration.

3% Romero, 321.
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Yet

Menem’s reform measures faced minimal opposition from organized labor, despite their
economic consequences, and what protests did occur had little impact on the course of

government policy.
This rapid decline of union influence was the result of the nation’s new economic
circumstances as well as changing dynamics within the labor movement itself. First of
all, growing unemployment meant that there were simply fewer active members in each
labor organization.

Secondly, growing disagreement among union leaders over what to

do in response to the Menem government’s actions split the CGT in two and limited the
size and impact of later popular protests as the reforms continued.*°?”

Thirdly, corruption

damaged the legitimacy of the union leadership in the eyes of industrial workers. The
close ties between workers’ unions and national politics, forged during the post-war
period of the 1940s, had created tight bonds between the Peronist party and the CGT.
Unions became an extension of the party apparatus and as such, union leaders became
involved in the political favoritism and clientelism for which the Peronist Party is
famous.

In the 1990s these practices became more and more common in order to ensure

union cooperation and support for new reforms.

Workers protested these practices by

publicly accusing union leaders of “illegal political practices (such as off-the-record
agreements with government authorities over financial matters), misrepresentation of
social interests (such as benefiting unions’ elites as opposed to the bases), and misuse of

°° Lewis, 170.
*” As a result of these differing opinions, dissenting CGT leaders formed splinter
organizations such as the Central de los Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA) and the
Movimiento de Trabajoders Argentinos (MTA). These groups would later go on to
organize manifestations and strikes associated with the PQM in protest of state economic
policies.
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public funds (such as hidden investments of resources for non-union purposes).”*® By
only mobilizing to protect the privileges of their elite few, union officials increasingly
distanced themselves from their constituencies.

As a result, an institution that had once

been a lynchpin in state-society relations was now seen as an aloof extension of the
current Peronist administration in which workers, both employed and unemployed, found

themselves on the outskirts of the political and economic landscape.

New economic policies also played a large part in reshaping the country’s socio-

economic make-up. The Menem administration’s push for economic development
encouraged economic growth at all costs and was achieved, often times, regardless of its
long-term social costs. Yet As long as national production increased and GDP continued
to grow, Argentine politicians seemed willing to overlook the reforms’ social costs for a
time. This season of unbridled economic growth would hold serious consequences for
Argentina as it looked toward the new millennium.

Among the most widespread of the

reforms’ social consequences was the growing inequality between socio-economic
classes within Argentine society. Growing inequality, in this case, does not simply refer
to a widening gap in salaries (though differences in income between rich and poor is
certainly an important factor) but also to the inverse relationships between economic
growth and employment, the distribution of national wealth, and the access to/quality of
social services.

All told, these growing inequalities meant that Argentine workers

quickly disassociated their own prospects for economic improvement with the nation’s

°8 Villalon, 255.
4]

macroeconomic growth.*”

Instead, the changing economic landscape would only further

segregate their needs and interests from those of the national economy.
As I previously mentioned, these economic policies necessitated a degree of labor
flexibility to which Argentine workers were not accustomed.

Jobs in key economic

sectors such as agricultural production and manufacturing were modernized and
mechanized in a push for greater efficiency and international competitiveness.

Unemployment was the end result of this process and this had a certain effect on the
national economy. From a sociological standpoint, however, unemployment also served

to distance individuals from the institutions and relationships that previously had
integrated them into society. A by-product of Menem’s market reforms was the erosion

of the “institutional thread that linked the individual, no only to a job but also to the
sindicate [workers union] and to politics. This loss of institutional relationships provoked
discouragement [among workers] to the point that it produced an estrangement from an
active, live, of social and political participation.”*°*!

This means that unemployment not

only caused the loss of a paycheck but also the disintegration of the social, political, and
economic networks to which one belonged.

This loss engendered a heightened sense of

social isolation and exclusion among the Argentine working class as previous means of

representation and social integration disappeared.”

* Nueva Cuestion social pg. 7
“° Original Text- “trama institucional que vinculaba al individuo no sélo al trabajo sino

también al sindicato y a la politica. Esta pérdida de relacion institucional [provocaba]
desaliento a alejamiento de la vida activa, de la participacion social y politica.”
* Nueva Cuestion Social, 9

* Ibid, 9
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In post-2001 Argentina, these changes began affecting the middle class on a large

scale as well. Instability in the labor market led to the eventual impoverishment of much
of the middle class, the so-called “new poor”.

The “new poor” were often well educated,

skilled in some trade, and accustomed to a certain level of integration within society.
Though these social and economic ties were severely strained by their lack of work, they
did not necessarily disappear.

The traditional poor had none of these resources and

lacked the opportunities to gain the education and job skills that would allow them to
reenter the job market.

As jobs continued to disappear, more wealth became

concentrated in fewer hands until nearly a third of the population was living below the
poverty line.*? Furthermore, state spending was being curbed in an effort to combat the
national debt and reduce public expenditures.

Just as a large portion of the population

was in dire need of its services, the state vastly reduced its extensive network of social
programs and services.

By 1992 the state had already reduced social spending by almost

half, from $8 billion in 1989 to $4.4 billion.** This trend would continue through the rest
of the decade, further accentuating existing inequalities.
While the lower sectors of society slid deeper into poverty, a small segment of
the population rapidly ascended the socio-economic ladder. The “new rich” were
composed of the beneficiaries of the rapid growth of Argentina’s consumer economy.
was this portion of society that “[prosperaba] ostentosamente” (prospered ostentatiusly)
during the 1990s and “[exhibia] sin complejos su riqueza, en muchos casos reciente, de
modo que las desigualdades no [se dismulaban] sino que [se escenificaban] y [se

43 Romero, 303.

“ Lewis, 172.
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It

espectacularizaban }."°,"°

The end result was a growing segregation between the rich

and the poor within Argentina’s social and economic spaces. The communal sense of “lo

publico”- shared spaces of public responsibility such as public education, public health
care, public safety, and even shared physical spaces such as plazas and streets- gave way

to “lo privado” in which the academy, the private clinic, the enclosed and guarded
subdivision, and shopping center are the norm*’. The growing division between socioeconomic classes thus increasingly polarized Argentine society, creating a larger gap
between the haves and the have-nots.

3.4 Theoretical connections
Part of the purpose of this chapter was to provide a historical overview of the
economic, political, and social process that were at work in Argentina during the 1990s
and early 2000s.

However, apart from their historical significance, how are the

transformations in these three areas relevant to our understanding of how and why the
PQM formed in the way that it did? I would argue that an understanding of these three
macro processes is important because they form the basis from which the smaller, micro
processes and mechanisms that spurred PQ mobilization are derived. An understanding of
these larger socio-economic processes thus outlines the limits and boundaries within
which later mobilization mechanisms must operate.

By this I meant that the mobilization

and development strategies utilized by the PQM were formed as a result of and in
response to the specific social, political, and economic contexts that these processes

* Translation- “Exhibited without qualms its riches, recently won in many cases, in such
a way that inequalities were not hidden but dramatized and spectacularized.”
46 Romero, 54.

"7 Thid, 304
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created. Thus, before one can jump into the details behind PQ mobilization strategies,

one must first understand the larger processes that shaped their creation.
Economic reform had a great impact on not only the prospects for the country’s
long-term economic stability but also on its socio-economic and political fabric.

Due to

legacy of Peronist-style populism, state led economic growth in Argentina had been
traditionally tied to the promotion of social justice and economic equality. Periods of
industrial development were usually accompanied by increased wage concessions for

workers and state investments in social services. Economic development could be
stimulated through increased investment in infrastructure and the assurance of a reliable
work force where workers would be guaranteed jobs, increased wages, and the
improvement of social services. During the Menem years, however, the state’s changing
role in the economy endangered this balance.

As the state abandoned its role as the

economic regulator, its ability to distribute public resources was directly affected. As a
result state-society interactions, the access to public services, means of political and
social representation, and relationships between different socio-economic classes were all
greatly affected.
Economically, neoliberal reforms contributed to the instability of the Argentine
economy during this period. Unemployment, the national debt, and dwindling state
resources Rather than reinforce and promote domestic production and industrial growth,
these policies left Argentina’s national economy vulnerable to the whims of international
investors and creditors.

Long-term economic planning could not be formulated as a

result of these conditions, forcing the government to comply with stiff austerity packages
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imposed by foreign creditors in order to survive in the short-run; further exaggerating the
nation’s economic weaknesses.

Politically, the greater public grew disillusioned with the federal government as a
result of its inability to address domestic social issues. Growing social inequality
combined with the continued hegemony of the traditional elite meant that the government
gradually lost credibility as a legitimate means by which the concerns and needs of
individuals could be addressed.

Institutions that had traditionally been closely tied to

state apparatus, such as the CGT, likewise suffered from a lack of public trust and
confidence.

And socially, deteriorating social conditions, dwindling state assistance

networks, and the loss of traditional institutions of social representation produced more
and more strain between the government and the Argentine working class.
It was within the context of this period in Argentine history that groups, such as
the piqueteros, began looking for alternative methods and means to express their needs,
demands, and discontent.

The solutions and strategies these groups formulated were

based upon certain assumptions and understandings of the problems these strategies were
meant to address.

Context thus informed function; strategy; the macro thus determined

the trajectory of the micro.
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Chapter 4: The Piquetero Movement

Up Close:

Collective Framings, Mobilizing Structures, and Political Opportunities/Constraints

In my theory chapter I outlined the two distinct processes that I would explore in
relation to SM mobilization and development: the macro shifts in external political,
social, and economic processes and the micro, internal mechanisms of group and
organizational development.

In the previous chapter I’ve shown how Argentina’s desire

for economic growth produced shifts in the country’s economic policy that in turn greatly
affected the country’s political, economic, and social make-up. The guarantor state was
exchanged for a system based on free-market capitalism in which the government
adopted a decidedly laissez faire stance. Over the course of the 1990s, the economic,

social, and political consequences that resulted from these changes left Argentina
politically weak and socially divided.

These processes shaped the landscape from which

the piqueteros would emerge. Reform created the socio-economic strain that would
ultimately crystallize piquetero grievances and provide the political opportunity
necessary for mobilization by weakening the Peronist Party’s hold over national politics.
Given these external conditions, I will now turn my attention to the internal
mechanisms that allowed the piqueteros to take advantage of these circumstances.
According to the theoretical framework I established in chapter two, this discussion will

focus on MM&Z’s three mobilizing structures: collective framings, resource
mobilization, and political opportunities/constraints.
three ideas only in very broad terms.

At this point I have outlined these

Here I hope to expound upon these three ideas in

greater detail and emphasize their usefulness in understanding piquetero development by
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connecting these development concepts to the piquetero narrative. The goal of this
chapter is thus two fold: 1) Provide a narrative account of the piquetero movement as it

unfolded over the course of the 1990s and early 2000s, and 2) To apply MM&Z’s
development theories to this historical account in order to better understand the
mechanisms by which the PQ were able to grow and develop.

Here, I must insert a brief aside in order to address a small methodological
challenge implicit in my analysis of PQ development. It is important to remember that the
piquetero movement is not a single unified entity or organization.

Rather, the PQM is a

conglomeration of numerous independently acting groups and organizations.

These

individual groups differ from each in various ways and can often be divided according to
numerous distinguishing factors such as geographic location, political ideology, or union/
political affiliation (or lack thereof) among many other things. The variety of its parts
thus makes it difficult to analyze the piquetero movement as a single entity since these
variations will inevitably impact how MM&Z three mobilizing structures manifest

themselves in each group. Yet despite these peripheral differences, I would argue all of
these organizations share common traits that unite them under the piquetero banner.
Thus, while I concede that there may be variations in regards to how these processes
unfold on an case by case basis, the commonalities that PQ organization share in regards
to their methods, group identities, and organization allow for them to be considered as a
whole.

The piquetero movement’s development can be divided into four phases:

the

emergence of contention (1993-1996), the diffusion of piquetero protest (1996-2001),
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period of nationwide picketeering (2001-2003), and the movement’s eventual decline
(2003-present)*"°.

Over the next few pages I will break down each of these three phases

individually, highlighting important protests, events, and developments within each

period, and then address one of MM&Z’s development structures (i.e. collective
framings, mobilizing structures, and political opportunities/constraints) within the context

of that particular phase. This is not to say that these three frames are time-specific or that
they unfold in a certain order over the course of SM development.

On the contrary, these

processes develop simultaneously with one often influencing another.

But in the interest

of simplicity, I will address each frame individually in order to show how each played a
role in the process of PQ mobilization.

These three theoretical frames, however, are useful beyond their use as a

framework from which one can analyze the processes of PQ development.

They also

point out the ways in which the piqueteros distinguish themselves from previous social
movements in Latin America. As I will argue at the end of this chapter, the discussions of
collective identity, grievances, resource mobilization, and changing state-society relations
that these theoretical frames engender point out how the piqueteros offer us a new take on
SM mobilization and development.

Thus while the majority of this chapter will focus on

the application of MM&Z’s three mobilizing structures to the timeline of PQ

* Villalon, 257.
” Since the main interest of this chapter lies in understanding the mechanisms of
development that facilitated the PQM’s growth and maturation and not the role these
mechanisms played in the movement’s effectiveness or successes, my analysis will focus
on the first three time periods only. Concerning possible explanations behind the PQ’s
gradual decline, I will leave that investigation to another researcher and will only engage
in any such discussion to the extent that it is relevant to my central topic of investigation.
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development, in the conclusion of this chapter I hope to briefly address how the

piqueteros might reshape our understanding of modern SMs in Latin America.

4.1 Emergence of Contention (1993-1996)

As early as 1993, the Menem administration’s economic reforms had begun to
take its toll on the Argentine lower class, especially state employees, and began to

produce isolated pockets of resistance in the interior provinces of Argentina. This
inaugural phase established important precedents and ideas in regards to PQ collective
framings and methods that would recur throughout subsequent phases and that would
greatly affect other mobilizing structures of the PQ movement.

The following three

accounts serve as examples of how popular unrest emerged in these early years as well as

how these initial protests began to frame how later protesters would understand their
struggle.

The Santiguefiazo

On December 16, 1993 ‘“‘approximately five thousand residents of the northwest

city of Santiago del Estero looted and burned three public buildings (the Government
House, the Courthouse, and the Legislature) and a dozen private residences of some of

the most prominent local officials and politicians (notably, the homes of three former
governors, a Supreme Court judge, and several members of the parliament).”” ° If the
“Shot heard round the world” heralded the beginning of the American revolution, then

*° Auyero, Javier. "The Moral Politics of Argentine Crowds." Latin American Social
Movements: Globalization, Democratization, and Transnational Networks. Eds.

Paul Almeida and Hank Johnston. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006,
147.
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D'Atri, Andrea, and Celeste Escati. “The Piquetera/o Movement of Argentina”.
Building Feminist Movements and Organisations. Association for Women's
Rights in Development, 1 Jan. 2009. Web.<http://www.awid.org/
eng/content/download/44884/482294/file/Case>, 2.
* Oviedo, Luis. Una Historia Del Movimiento Piquetero: De Las Primeras
5 pordinador as a Las Asembleas Nacionales. Buenos Aires: Ed. Rumbos, 2001,
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body that then resolved to begin a general strike involving the whole town.’

The

protests in Neuquén province serve as just a few examples of the growing unrest across
the interior of the country as state-owned companies began downsizing or closing their
doors. In response to growing protests, Neuquén’s governor approved Law 2128 (Ley

2128), a measure that established a 200 peso per month subsidy for /os jefes de familia
desocupados (unemployed heads of households).

The measure was aimed at

temporarily quieting protesters but only served to further encourage additional action as
protesters saw that they could successfully extract from the government the resources that
they needed.

Ley 2128 established an important precedent in the PQM story. From this

point on, subsidies and other government assistance packages would play a large role in
mediating state-protester relations on a national level. The establishment of Ley 2128
foreshadowed a process that would take on a much larger scope of significance as PQ

activities increased in magnitude and intensity.

Los Cutralcazos
The protests in Neuquén province signaled a shift in demographics during this
initial period of protests.

The same piqutero methods (piquetes, cortes de ruta) that YPF

workers had used in Neuquén began to extend themselves to the greater workers

movement.*® On June 21, 1996, National Road 22 and Provincial Road 17 were blocked
by piqueteros from the cities of Cutral Co and Plaza Huincul after the provincial

government cancelled a contract with the Canadian business Agrium to construct a

* Thid, 21.
°° Ibid, 22.
*© Ibid, 41
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fertilizer plant in the region.°”** Cutral Co and Plaza Huincul, much like the previously

mentioned cities within Neuquén province, were cities that had been built on the
foundation of oil production by YPF and who were similarly affected by the
unemployment produced by company’s privatization and subsequent downsizing. Days
before, five hundred unemployed convened a popular assembly in response to the

provincial governor’s decision to lower the assistance subsidies provided under the Ley
2128. The assembly had resolved to stage a march “against hunger and unemployment”
on July 21.°° On the day of the march, spurred on and encouraged by local radio stations
broadcasting the loss of the contract with Agrium, thousands of people (more than 20,000
at the protest’s peak) took to the streets in protest.”
This first mass protest, known as the Cutralcazo, sparked a series of smaller
demonstrations, general strikes, and popular assemblies over the course of the next year.

The following year, in March of 1997, “a general provincial strike supported the march of
more than 10,000 teachers, students, parents and neighbors that culminated with the

occupation of the two bridges that unite [the provinces of] Neuquén and Rio Negro.
Piquetero methods were now the common patrimony of the exploited!"°"

The corte

lasted for two days and was met with strong police repression, resulting in several deaths
and dozens wounded.

*” Ibid, 43
8 Auyero, 147.
9 Oviedo, 43.
60 Auyero,155.
‘ Original Text: “Un paro general provincial apoyo la marcha de mas de 10,000
docentes, estudiantes, padres y vecinos, que culmin6 con la ocupcién de los puentes que

unen Neuquén y Rio Negro. Los métodos piqueteros ya eran un patrimonio comtn de los
explotados!”
Oviedo, 47.
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The Cutralcazos marked an important transition in the spread of piquetes and of
piqueteros throughout Argentina.

They accomplished this by transforming the substance

of piquetero protests in two main ways.

First, piquetero methods, as Luis Oviedo stated,

were now being employed by a larger cross-section of the population. Piguetes and
cortes de ruta within Neuquén province now incorporated broad class coalitions among
the cities’ working class, teachers, neighbors, retirees, and students.

Collective action

was no longer the “patrimony”, as Oviedo says, of the working class but a collective
activity by which all citizens could express their contempt for the province’s economic
policies and their dissatisfaction with the socio-economic conditions these policies had
created. Piquetero methods were no longer seen as belonging to a singular socioeconomic group (i.e. state employees) but were transformed into an expression of
community solidarity and formed a collective response to the town’s economic
predicament.
Secondly, the Cutralcazos facilitated the crystallization of piquetero

grievances. In the case of the first Cutralcazo, the political discourse among
protesters at the protest site gradually transformed protester grievances from the
specific (“we want the fertilizer plant”) to a more general call for economic

change (“‘we need jobs”).

Piquetero grievances began to transcend the local

issues and contexts that had first driven protesters to the streets and were
transformed into a discussion of the larger economic processes that were changing

the socio-economic landscape of the country. The piqueteros of Neuquén
province consequently began to understand their grievances within the larger

8 Auyero, 157.
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context of Argentina’s push for economic transformation.

This realization would

have a large long-term impact on the trajectory of later piquetero protests.

Here

we see that the Cultracazo’s importance to the PQ narrative, in fact the

importance of this whole first phase of initial protests, has very little to do with
whether or not protesters were successful in the end. Rather it is how the
experiences of these first protests facilitated the formation of a piquetero identity.
According to MM&Z this process of identity building, a collective understanding
among protesters as to the similar grievances and shared struggles that bind them

together as a group, is a key component in the process of SM mobilization. That
being the case, the process of identity building is a topic I will discuss in more

detail over the course of the next few pages.

4.2 Early Protests and the Building of Collective Identity
As I mentioned in my discussion of MM&Z theoretical frames, one of the
necessary conditions for SM mobilization and development is this process of building

collective “identities” or “frames”.

In this process individuals try to unite its members

towards a common goal by identifying shared struggles and experiences among its
members. Each group must ask itself: What unites us a body? Who are we as a group?
What are we struggling for? And what are we struggling against? This process of identity
building is important because in the process of answering these questions, movements
must form specific ideas concerning the origins of the grievances they are trying to
address and the ways in which those grievances might be rectified. Identity building is
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thus important because it has the ability to effect how a SM formulates its methods,
goals, and course of actions.
One of the first steps in this process of identity building is the defining of

grievances. The defining of grievances is a process in which a group forms a collective
understanding as to the nature of the strains that first drove the group to protest. This
process requires that a group make certain judgments concerning the contexts in which
these strains appeared.

These judgments are subjective and may vary, depending on the

socio-economic make up of the groups’ members.

As a result, group grievances, and

consequently group identities, are to a certain degree functions of the socio-economic
variables (class, education, income, etc.) that characterize a group’s members.

My investigation of the PQM during this phase of initial protests will explore how
the piqueteros went about this activity of defining grievances for two reasons: 1)
Piquetero experiences in this process would do much to shape the collective “frames”
piqueteros would employ in understanding their social, political, and economic context.
The shared group identity they would form as a result would subsequently inform the
PQM’s goals, methods, and development strategies.

2) By investigating the creation of

piquetero group identity, I will better understand how the macro socio-economic
processes at work in Argentina during this time intersected with mechanisms (collective
identity in this case) that informed the PQM’s development.

Initial Protests and Piquetero Demographics
As opposed to the urban poor and unemployed that would compose the PQM in
its later phases of development, resistance during these first two protests were incited by
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workers within the upper echelons of the state’s social assistance networks. That is to say,
the individuals who largely composed the groups that participated these first protests

were skilled workers who depended upon state companies, such as YPF, for their salary
and livelihood. It is important to point out that in these first two episodes of resistance,
the socio-economic make-up of protest participants differs significantly from what we
will see in subsequent phases of the PQM’s development.

Because the state employees

that participated in these protests had access to better education, job training, and social
support networks, they did not suffer from the same lack of socio-economic integration
that would characterize those that would later compose urban PQ organizations.

This

being the case, the resources available to the groups involved in the Santiguefiazo would
differ from those in later phases of protests. However, in terms of collective frames and
grievances, these protesters shared much in common with the piqueteros that would
compose the Cutralcazo and later piquetero protests.

In this case both groups focused their protests on the effects that Menem’s
economic reform had on state resources and assistance programs, and the increase in

public need that these effects produced.

State employees in Santiago del Estero acted in

order to address this issue of back-paid salaries. YPF employees in Neuquén as well as
piqueteros in Cutral Co and Plaza Huincul would protest the unemployment and lack of
basic services that the privatization of the oil company had produced. In later phases of
development, piquetero manifestations in and around Buenos Aires would criticize the
depletion of state assistance programs upon which protesters had depended on for their
livelihood. Piquetero demands consistently focused on job creation, food subsidies, and

other means of state assistance. The common thread between all of these groups was that
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on some level, all understood their grievances to be a direct result of the government’s
new economic strategy.

Perspectives on Piquetero Identity
The experiences of these early protests were such that the piqueteros came to
understand their struggle within the greater context of Argentina’s push for economic
development. Piquetero identity thus became a function of how the piqueteros understood
their place within the context of Menem’s economic development strategy and
Argentina’s larger economic system. The next natural question to ask given this
statement is: what did the piquetero’s understanding of their function within the country’s
push for economic development look like?
A central theme in piquetero identity is closely connected with the idea of

exploitation. In an interview conducted by Marina Sitrin with several members of the
Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados (Unemployed Workers Movement, MTD),

one piquetero, in response to a question concerning the piquetero conception of work,
answered with the following response:
work 16 hours and be exploited.

“Dignified work is not going back to a factory to

We want to generate different projects, projects, without

bosses, where the workers themselves, the same compafieros decide what to so do with
the production.”

As evidence by his response, piqueteros understood their place in the

current economic system to be that of the “exploited”.

Furthermore, they understood the

underlying economic principles of the country’s economic system to be oriented toward

® Sitrin, Marina. We Are Everywhere: the Irresistible Rise of Global Anti-capitalism.
London: Verso, 2003. We Are Everywhere. Web.<http://artactivism.gn.apc.org/
allpdfs/472-The%20Power%200f%20the.pdf>.
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the benefit of the “exploiters” and not the “exploited.”
As a result, the free-market principles that under girded Argentina’s approach to

economic development came under increasing criticism. The ultimate blame “for the
undesirable status of being poor [was] shifted away from those unable to find work; such

poor individuals [were] now deemed merely the unwilling victims of the capitalist system
and those who benefit from it.” In the end, piqueteros understood their predicament to
be a product of Argentina’s free-market approach to economic development rather than
any single political actor, institution, or policy. Actors and policies were not necessarily

the source of their problem; rather it was the economic principles upon which the current
economic system was based. Piqueteros increasingly identified capitalism as the origin
of their particular grievances, and as a result, the reformation of the capitalist system (in

its Argentine context and application) became an important focal point of piquetero
dialogue and protest. The expansion of the scope of piquetero demands, in the case of the
Cutralcazo, from the fulfilling of immediate local needs (“we need the fertizlier plant’) to
a broader call for economic reform (“we need steady employment opportunities”) serves
as evidence of this shift.

® Enstein, Edward. "The Piquetero Movement in Greater Buenos Aires: Working class

protest during the current Argentine Crisis." Canadian Journal of Latin American
and Caribbean Studies (2003). Www.findarticles.com. Web. 14 Oct. 2009.
°° Auyero, Javier. "The Moral Politics of Argentine Crowds." Latin American Social
Movements: Globalization, Democratization, and Transnational Networks. Eds.

Paul Almeida and Hank Johnston. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006,
157.
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The PQM and the Neoliberal Model
Piqueteros were not necessarily opposed to the idea of developing the national
economy. What they did oppose was the idea that economic development be realized at
the expense of the livelihoods of the lower classes. Neoliberal logic, however,
necessitated the dismantling of much of the state-sponsored social assistance networks
and programs that many of the lower classes depended on for employment and other
basic necessities. The implementation of these changes and their subsequent effects,
protests such as the Cutralcazo, shaped piquetero identity in that piqueteros began to
think of their struggle in terms of its relation to the capitalist, neoliberal economic
system. But on a broader level, piqueteros also understood their struggle to embody a
national struggle over the country’s philosophy of economic and social growth.
Oviedo notes that,

“The Cultralcazo laid bare the irreconcilable contradiction between the
needs of the popular majority and the capitalist state, even in its
"democratic" form.

[The Cutralcazo] showed that popular sovereignty,

completely fictitious in the framework of a capitalist democracy,
rediscovers itself in popular demonstrations.

The Cutralcazo showed that

the capitalist state is a machine organized to respond to the needs of the
exploiters and not those of the exploited.

The Cutralcazo revealed that

popular movement victory will only be achieved by an overcoming of the
restrictions imposed by the capitalist state, a push for direct action on the
part of the people, and by creating organizations adapted to the fight, that
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respond directly to the will and mandate of the people.”°”*

In this context, piquetero protests and demands can be seen as a means by which

participants could confront the inadequacies of what they saw as a flawed economic
system. In the eyes of the piqueteros, economic development based on the neoliberal
model would inevitably prejudiced the lower class; that it would perpetually concentrate
economic, political, and social resources in the hands of the few elite, while excluding the
rest of society. The duty of popular protest was thus to overcome the restrictions and

barriers the capitalist system created and form organizations that would place power back
in the hands of the people. These ideas had a large impact on the piquetero’s worldview.
The political and economic perspective that they engendered would impact piquetero
goals, scope of demands, and, I will discuss in the next section, methods of protest.

Piquetes and Cortes de Ruta

The PQM thus adopted a method of protest that logically followed from their
understanding of the processes and ideas that caused their grievances: the roadblock.
This first phase of protests is thus important because it is here that the corte de ruta and
piquete were established as important means of disruptive protest. These methods would

*’ Original Text: “El Cutralcazo puso al desnudo la contradiccién irreconciliable entre las

necesidades de la mayoria popular y el Estado capitalist, incluso en su forma
‘democratica’. Mostré que la soberania popular, completemente ficticia en el marco de la
democracia capitalista, se reencuentra a si misma en la movilizacion popular. El

Cutralcazo mostr6é que el Estado capitalista es una maquinaria organizada para responder
a las necesidades de los explotadores, no de los explotados. El Cutralcazo revel que la
victoria de cualquier movimiento popular obliga a superar las restricciones que impone el
Estado capitalista a la accion directa del pueblo, y a crear organizaciones adaptadas a la
lucha, que respondan directamente a la voluntad y mandato de las bases”

* Oviedo, 44.
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become pillars of PQ protests and activities.
Roadblocks are the “equivalent of workers laying down the tools of production”
in that they “paralyze the circulation of goods, both inputs for production and outputs
destined for domestic or overseas markets.”®’ Simultaneous protests coordinated among
regional and national PQ leaders could effectively bring state and interstate commerce to
a standstill. In a country whose scattered commercial centers are inter-connected by only
a small network of poorly maintained roads, these methods proved to be highly effective
in capturing the attention of the provincial and, later on, national government.
Roadblocks and pickets thus became the principal tools the PQs used by which they were
able to extract concessions from the government
The roadblock, however, is an important part of PQ activities not only because of
its effectiveness at disrupting national commerce but also because of its symbolic value.
By coordinating cortes, protesters effectively paralyzed the very economic system that

contributed towards the creation of their grievances in the first place. The disruptive
nature of the corte not only gave the piqueteros a certain measure of leverage against the

government, but also helped unite piqueteros in a single cause - the fight against the
state’s unbridled push for economic development at the expense of their livelihood.

Participation in protest activities thus became a symbolic way for piqueteros to express
their solidarity, unity, and commitment to one another in a shared fight.

® Petras, 2001, 5.
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Theoretical Connections

In terms of collective framing, this first phase of protests, though scattered and
isolated, did much to create a sense of common identity among its participants and those
that would participate in the later phases of PQ development.

This common identity was

shaped by the piquetero’s understanding of the larger socio-economic processes that had

produced their grievances — namely, the Menem administration’s economic development
strategy and the free-market capitalist model upon which they were based. These
processes provided a common bond among piquetero protesters due to the shared socioeconomic circumstances that widespread unemployment and the dismantling of state

social services produced. Since protesters understood their grievances to be the product
of these state economic policies and the neoliberal ideals upon which those policies were
based, the piqueteros were provided a common enemy against which they could direct
their activities. And furthermore, their collective participation in roadblocks and pickets
served as an activity that bound PQ members in a common struggle, reinforcing the sense
of shared purpose and identity that resulted from their shared circumstances.

4.3 Diffusion of Piquetero Protest (1996-2001)
Early protests by state workers soon spread to other parts of the country,
eventually reaching the urban areas of Buenos Aires. Prior to this point, protests in the
interior of the country had been limited in their reach and brief in their duration. Protests
were sparked by localized strains specific to the area of protest. However, once protests
spread to the capital city, the movement gained momentum in its number of participants,
frequency of protests, and visibility on the national and international stage as a result of
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the opportunities offered by the city’s urban environment.

The translation of protests to

the urban context of Buenos Aires is thus a crucial inflection point in the piquetero story
since it provided protesters a context in which they were able to mobilize on a larger
scale,

Once reaching Buenos Aires, collective action now centered on the structurally
unemployed masses that inhabited the cordones surrounding the city’. The urban poor
that populated this area became the driving force behind these protests as opposed to the
professionals, state employees, and factory workers that engineered protests during the
previous period in the country’s interior. The inhabitants of these areas were largely
unemployed, uneducated, and lacking in access to basic social services. As a result, these

individuals were heavily reliant upon state social assistance for their livelihood. Since
the urban poor lacked the social networks, financial resources, job skills, and political
connections to re-integrate themselves into the national economy or effectively voice
their needs, they were forced to turn to alternative methods of representation. PQOs
offered the urban poor this type of opportunity and piquetero numbers grew exponentially
as aresult. By 2001, 40% of piquetero protests occurred in and around Buenos Aires; by
2003 that number had grown to 53%.’ During this period, Buenos Aires became the
epicenter of national piquetero protests. As a result, the PQ organizations located on the
outskirts of the city would gain the most national (and international) attention and would
be most represented in on-going negotiations with the national government.

'
‘
D'Atri,
4.
7! Massetti, Astor. Pigueteros: Protesta Social E Identidad Colectiva. Buenos Aires: Ed.
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The PQM in Buenos Aires emerged as a composition of individual groups based
on their regional/territorial location in and around Buenos Aires. Groups formed and
organized independently from one another, meaning no one group looked exactly like
another. Each group had its own leaders, group politics, and demands but would often
work together in conjunction with brother/sister organizations. These cooperatives would
allow the protesters to better coordinate activities and protests and increase their ability to
disrupt national commerce.

Protests, marches, and roadblocks grew in frequency and

scale as a result of these efforts.

The arrival of protest to the greater Buenos Aires area contributed greatly to the
growth and maturation of the PQM. The city offered a large, concentrated pocket of
individuals who had been negatively impacted by Argentina’s changing economic state.
As aresult, protesters had easy access to the very demographic that would be most
willing to engage in collective action. Furthermore, the environment of Buenos Aires’
urban, impoverished suburbs produced the shared circumstances and grievances

conducive to the creation of common group identities, which I have already discussed.
But more importantly, the city provided a place in which protesters and protests could be
more effectively mobilized. The PQM as a whole was bolstered by the increased ease
with which PQOs could now attract new members, organize protests, and coordinate

activities on a large scale. However, even though the city provided protesters numerous
opportunities for development and growth, how were the piqueteros able to take
advantage of these opportunities? What mechanisms and structures did PQOs form in

65

order to do so? These are the questions I will address in the following section with a
discussion of piquetero mobilizing structures.

4.4 POM Growth and Mobilizing Structures

When the spread of the interior country’s episodic protests arrived in the urban
environment of Buenos Aires, the PQM was faced with several structural and

organizational hurdles to its further development and growth. First, piquetero protesters
needed to collect and acquire resources. And secondly, piqueteros needed to create
formal organizational structures in order to effectively utilize these resources. These
tasks are linked to what MM&Z have labeled the creation of mobilizing structures. This
concept deals with the formation of methods by which SMs take advantage of the
resources (monetary, human, or otherwise) available to them in a certain context and
utilize those resources to further their activities and meet goals. In this section I will

explore the formation of piquetero mobilizing structures during this phase of the
movement’s growth. This will first involve an exploration of the mechanisms that
allowed PQOs to aggregate and acquire resources, and secondly, the formation of the
organizational and leadership structures that PQOs used to determine how those
resources would be used.

Resource Mobilization
Soon after piquetero protests reached Buenos Aires, the PQM was no longer a
concern of just local or state authorities.

With such an increase in protests right on its

doorstep, the national government soon became involved in mediating piquetero
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grievances as well. In response to growing unrest the national government established the
Plan Trabajar in 1997, a law very similar to the previously mentioned Ley 2128, creating
temporary employment opportunities for the poor and establishing monthly government
subsidies and stipends for unemployed heads of households”.

In terms of resource mobilization, the urban unemployed and poor possessed little
capital of their own that could be used to attract potential members or utilized to further
their cause. Thus, for reasons of unemployment, lack of education, or social connections,

the poor were effectively excluded from the social, political, and financial networks that
might have provided these resources. I established earlier how from a theoretical
standpoint one could not say that grievances alone are sufficient cause for SM
mobilization and growth. More than a shared belief that its circumstances are unjust and

should be changed, a movement must have some mechanism or point of leverage that
propels its activities and growth. Considering PQ participant’s socio-economic condition
and lack of resources, to what then does one attribute the movement’s growth and

development during this period and those that followed? I argue that the promise of
government subsidies, as established by the Plan Trabajar, provided the necessary
incentives and resources that drove PQ growth.
In this I agree with Lucas Ronconi and Ignacio Franceshelli in their article
“Clientelism, Public Workfare, and the Emergence of the Piqueteros in Argentina.” ”°

” Villalon, 266.
8 Ronconi, Lucas, and Ignacio Franceschelli. "Clientelism, Public Workfare and the
Emergence of the Piqueteros in Argentina." Political Institutions and

Development: Failed Expectations and Renewed Hopes. Ed. Natalia E. Dinello
and Vladimir Popov.

Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007, 228-46.
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There they argue that piqutero growth and protests were driven by more than a shared

public desire to fight unemployment and poverty or a desire for social justice, but by the
necessity for temporary assistance. Piquetes thus became a means by which protesters

could obtain desired goods (subsidies) rather than an ideological reaction to broader
changes within the government. I agree with their assessment concerning the importance
of the Plan Trabayjar in facilitating piquetero growth and its function as a mobilizing
mechanism. However, I believe they short sell the impact that the larger political,

economic, and social changes had on the public, especially the lower class. For that
reason I have tried to emphasize in this investigation how larger socio-economic and
political factors shaped the smaller processes involved in the PQM’s birth and subsequent
growth.
The Plan Trabajar, much like Ley 2128, thus acted as a mobilizing mechanism.

First, it provided temporary assistance that the piqueteros needed. Though there were
many temporarily or newly unemployed persons who would later join the piquetero

cause, especially as the country’s economic condition worsened, a large percentage of
persons involved were perennially without work even before the economy took a
downturn. Economic assistance during the latter half of the 1990s was thus even more of
anecessity for this cross-section of the lower class.

Secondly, the ability of piquetero activities (marches, cortes de ruta, piquetes) to
extract these initial concessions from the government held out the possibility of future
expanded assistance. The prospect of extracting further concessions provided an
incentive to continue pressuring the government via protests. Furthermore, government
subsidies served as an effective recruiting tool since the deteriorating national economy
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continued to produce more and more unemployed to whom the prospect of government

aid would seem attractive.
Thirdly, the method by which aid was distributed reinforced among the
unemployed the importance of continued association and participation with local PQ
organizations. The Plan Trabajar did not establish a state-run mechanism for the

distribution and administration of its subsidies. Rather, following negotiations between
the state and whatever PQO (or group of PQOs) that were protesting, these

responsibilities were transferred to the individual organizations. The limited number of
planes available to each organization meant that they would have to be shared within the

group. Since the planes, and the provisional employment they provided, were only
temporary measures, members were put on a rotating list and would then have to wait
their turn to receive the monthly subsidies. What PQ organizers soon realized was that
this PQO controlled distribution system provided a unique advantage. Namely, that it

provided a way for PQ organizations to ensure the continued member participation in
group activities and protests.
One of the problems that all SMs must solve is that of the “free-rider.” The freerider problem is a trend in which individuals choose to abstain from risky social behavior,

such as protesting, if they believe that they will be able to share in the benefits of those
protests regardless of their personal involvement.

Why risk the negative consequences of

social movement if others are willing to protest, and you will be able to reap the benefits
of their work? The free-rider problem poses the dilemma of how SMs can prevent the
whole from benefiting from the work of the few. That is to say, how can SMs encourage
individual membership in collective action and ensure that individual’s continued

69

participation even when times get tough.

For the PQM, PQO controlled subsidy

distribution systems functioned as the answer to this problem. In order to be eligible to
receive government subsidies, many PQOs require members to pay a small monthly fee
and be in good standing with their respective PQO.

Consequently, only individuals who

stayed involved in PQO activities, protests, and programs could expect to receive

government assistance.

An additional side effect of this strategy was its ability to limit

the fluidity of PQO membership.

To a certain degree, the PQO controlled distribution

system encouraged protesters to choose a particular organization and stick with that
organization, promoting organizational allegiance and solidarity.

As a result of these various factors, temporary subsidies soon became the
currency that governed piquetero-state and interactions as well as inner politics within the

PQM itself. Competing for these subsidies became a top priority among PQOs since
those groups that were able to win more planes benefited from the increase in
membership and influence that accompanied these aid packages.

The creation of the Plan

Trabajar was thus a significant development towards further piquetero mobilization and
growth because it provided the PQM with mechanisms necessary for its continued growth
and expansion. It provided material resources in terms of state money and temporary
work for members.

It promoted increased participation in piquetero activities in terms of

increased membership as well as ensuring the continued involvement of those members.
And finally, it facilitated the creation of internal organizational structure within PQOs for
the purpose of aid distribution. All of these developments are a direct result of the Plan
Trabajar’s creation.
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The PQM is an interesting case study because it seems to dispel the notion of the

“atomized poor’; the idea that the traditional peasantry is incapable of mounting any
serious opposition to an existing region on its own due to the lack of resources inherent to
the group’s socio-economic make-up.

One might be tempted to think that the PQM

serves an exception to this rule. However, by looking at how the Plan Trabar affected and
facilitated the PQM’s growth, one can see that this is not the case. In the Plan Trabajar,

the Argentine state provided the PQM with resources and mobilization opportunities it
would not otherwise have enjoyed left on its own. Without this influx of external
resources, it is probable that the PQM would not have enjoyed such a period of growth
and expansion. As a result, the PQM seems to reinforce the idea of the atomized poor

rather than undermine it, since in many ways it owes its growth and expansion to the
actions and resources of the state rather than to any force within the movement itself.

Organizational Structure

The Plan Trabajar served as a resource mobilization mechanism in that it provided
the PQM a way to attract new members, acquire funds in the form of government
subsidies, and encourage the continuation of piquetero protests.

How PQOs then

decided to utilize these resources was a function of each organization’s internal structure.
In my description of this period of PQ development, I mentioned that the PQM in Buenos

Aires was decentralized in its leadership and structural organization. In this section, I
will investigate possible reasons why the PQM became structured this way as well as its

affects on PQO organization and inter-movement dynamics.
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I would argue that the PQM splintered into individual groups, as opposed to
combining together as a single organizational entity, for two reasons: 1) a lack of social

networks linking protesters from across the city meant that groups formed around one of
the few social networks they had, their neighborhoods and 2) a deep seated mistrust of
bureaucracy meant that the piqueteros attempted to prevent the concentration of power in
too few hands, resulting in the splintering of the movement in order to conserve the

group’s egalitarian ethos.

As I mentioned earlier, the traditional peasantry that composed the PQM lacked
many of the social networks that were more readily available to other sections of

Argentine society. Thus, when the wave of protests that had started in the interior reached
Buenos Aires, piquetero groups formed around one of the few formal social institutions
that they possessed, neighborhood assemblies. Neighborhood assemblies were composed
of the people within a certain barrio that would meet to discuss and debate issues that
faced the residents of their specific neighborhood.

These neighborhood assemblies

would become the building blocks upon which the city’s first piquetero groups were built
in response to worsening social and economic conditions. The PQM’s decentralization
was thus, in one sense, a result of the scattered pre-existing social networks that
piqueteros possessed. This grass roots approach meant that the PQOs were often

separated along the geographical barriers that distinguished one neighborhood from
another. The result was a proliferation of autonomous piquetero cells as opposed to a
single governing entity.
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Additionally, the piqueteros’ rejection of traditional political institutions and

hierarchies produced a general mistrust of large bureaucracies among protesters. Recent
history had evidenced how government bureaucracy could co-opt working class
endeavors. Union workers particularly had seen efforts for higher salaries and increased

benefits undermined by government politicians. The CGT’s leadership structure
combined with the union’s close ties to Argentina’s political system meant that
politicians could easily influence and co-opt union efforts by offering political and
monetary favors to union leaders. Likewise, many of the perennially unemployed were all
too familiar with the fickle patronage system that fueled party politics in Argentina.

Political parties and politicians often gave material resources in exchange for votes.
Piqueteros were well aware of the possibility and the power of political cooptation and

coercion. As a result, PQOs adopted a more horizontally orientated distribution of power
as a means of discouraged the concentration of too much power in the hands of too few.
This holds true for both the internal structure of individual PQOs and the structure of the
movement as a whole.
As I mentioned in my analysis of piquetero frames and identities, piqueteros
understood their struggle to be about a return of political honesty and legitimacy —a
returning of power, particularly political power, to the masses. Piqueteros saw their

current political leaders as unresponsive to the voices and needs of the popular masses.
Thus, as PQOs began consolidating more formal leadership structures, their internal
distribution of power reflected this. Pablo Solana, an unemployed electrician who works
with the MTD Lanus and who was interviewed by Sitrin, describes his assembly’s

decision-making process like this:
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“It’s pretty simple: a group of neighbors has a weekly assembly; the
discussion that needs to happen, the information that needs to be shared,

and the decisions that need to be made are all done at the assembly. It’s
that simple and direct, it’s the way that democracy works in our
neighborhood. When we have to co-ordinate various neighborhoods and
when the organization grows, it becomes a bit more complex and debates
are held on how to co-ordinate in a way that doesn’t create atmosphere of
centralized decision making.

Within that debate we discuss the election of

delegate and the way that they rotate, it’s a way we found so that it’s not
always the same people playing the same role.”

Dissatisfaction with the current political leadership and a distrust of traditional
political institutions meant that the piqueteros placed a premium on organizational
autonomy and self-governance. These sentiments consequently had a large impact on
how PQ institutions organized internally PQOs were thus internally decentralized in their
distribution of power. Many PQ organizations operated on the principles of direct

democracy. Group decisions would be made in popular assemblies by majority vote.
The popular assembly could revoke the mandate of elected representatives at any point.’”°
These mechanisms were established in order to prevent the co-optation of the
movement by outside political forces. Solana would go on to say that, “we did want our
grassroots organization, our neighborhood force [to] not be subordinated by partisans or
unions or be subordinated by the logic proposed by the state. And that’s how we started

™ Sitrin, 476.
® Petras, 2001.
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organizing, with the idea that the assembly should be the place where decisions are
made.””® This style of leadership distribution stands in stark contrast to that of worker
organizations in previous decades, such as the CGT, in that it is designed to encourage
the unemployed poor’s participation in their own decision-making.’’ Asambleas thus
serve as a source of symbolic, counter political power to that of the national political
system of the time.

On a broader, movement-wide level the decentralized structure of the PQM has
served a necessary and important role in “promoting local initiatives and leadership and
guarding the autonomy of the various movements.””®

However, this does not mean that

PQOs act completely independent from one another. On the contrary, individual groups

often worked jointly with other PQOs in order to coordinate protests, debate common
problems, and formulate reponses to government actions. Formal congresses, such as the

First and Second National Piquetero Assemblies that were held in June and September of
2001, were held in an effort to promote inter-organization communication.”

Yet despite,

these efforts towards increased inter-organization cooperation, individual PQOs continue
to assert their own individual autonomy. Thus, though these congresses did much to
facilitate the coordination of PQO activities, they accomplished little in regards to
creating a more unified movement.
One of the effects of this horizontally structured organizational strategy is that, for
the most part, individual PQOs continue to pursue their own agendas. All PQOs continue

"© Sitrin, 478.
u Epstein

® Petras, 2001
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to vie for government subsidies, and to that end they often coordinate protests and
activities. But in terms of the movement’s overall cohesiveness, organizational

fragmentation prevents PQOs from being able to more effectively work as unit. The
emergence of political divisions as a result of differing political affiliations, ideologies,
and expectations among PQOs created further rifts within the PQM.

The creation of

these divisions, a process I will examine more closely in following sections, allowed
certain PQOs to dominate public discourse due to their particular political affiliation.
Thus, over time one of the movement’s greatest strengths, its decentralized

structure, became one of its greatest hurdles in terms of the movement’s long term
prospects to effect change within the political system. Lacking any central leadership,
the PQM was thus less susceptible to the patronage politics that had undermined popular
protests in the past. Nevertheless, the splintering of the movement along political lines

meant, “no organization had the support to assume any leadership role (even as each
pretended to be self-sufficient) and define a political project toward eventually taking
state power. In the absence of a unified and cohesive leadership, intellectual dilettantes
and local leaders carved up the movements in the name of autonomist fetishism.”*°

4.5 Nationwide Picketeering (2001-2003)
In a previous chapter I described at length the economic and political events that
surrounded the Argentine currency crisis in December 2001.

I will not repeat that

information here, but rather add a few comments as to how these events affected the

trajectory of the PQM at the time of the crash and in the following two years. According

80 Petras, 2003.
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to Roberta Villalon, there were two major developments during this period in terms of the

PQM’s development. The first was a shift in scale in terms of the movement’s number of
protests and active participants, and what she refers to as the “appropriation of sites of

mobilization.”*' Second, was the process among PQOs in which “certain picketer
organizations became dominant at the regional and national level and organized
coordinated picketing across the entire country, [changing] the decentralized character of
the movement.”®?

The movement’s shift in scale and “appropriation of sites of mobilization” is a
result of the explosive growth of social unrest following the events of December 2001.
The greatest impact of the 2001 currency crisis in terms of its effect not just on the PQM
but on the growth of protest and collective action in general throughout the country, was

the increased participation of the middle class that resulted. The 2001 crash meant that
the middle class, who to some degree had only been marginally impacted by the nation’s

economic policies up to this point (compared to the working class), now had more in
common with those men and women who composed the PQM than upper class elites. To
use the words of James Petras, the period of Deceber 2001 through July 2002 saw the

middle-class “proletarianized” in living standards if not in outlook.* The result was the
increased participation among the middle class in protest activities of all kinds. The
cacerolazos, for example, that filled the streets of Buenos Aires following December 19",
were largely composed of middle class citizens who’s savings had been confiscated in

Duhalde’s corralito. The financial crisis thus sparked a period of increased nationwide

8! Vilalén, 257,
® Tid, 258.
8 Petras, 2003.
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protests during which the piqueteros, as one of the many protest organization active at the

time, benefited from this period of increased social unrest.
For the piqueteros, the nation’s economic state meant that movement activities

grew in both scale and scope. Piquetero protests expanded in both its number of
participants and the geographical area in which protests occurred. With the incorporation
of the middle class, the PQM now enjoyed a high level of popular support among the
middle class, whereas in previous years its activities had often been viewed as a nuisance.
Now, however, students, teachers, lawyers, doctors, and small business owners regularly

joined with the poor and unemployed in a coalition encompassing a broad variety of
socio-economic groups.®4

This is not to say that the middle class was never involved in

PQ activities before this time, but that the 2001 crash acted as a catalyst that facilitated
the increased incorporation of the middle class as a result of the economic crash. Thereby
creating an environment in which the movement could more easily expand its number of
participants and supporters.

The second major development was the gradual

establishment of an internal hierarchy among PQOs within the PQM. As Roberta Vilalon
noted, it was during this time that “certain picketer organizations became dominant at the
regional and national level” while others were pushed to the margins in terms of their

visibility in the public eye and their influence in state-piquetero negotiations. As to why
this happened, I believe this process was the function of the relationships different PQOs
formed with traditional political institutions. Despite the emphasis placed on
organizational autonomy and independence from traditional political institutions within

the PQM, many PQOs formed formal and informal ties with various political actors such

“ Aguilar
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as labor unions, political parties, and neighborhood party-bosses. These relationships
played a large part in creating this new inter-organizational hierarchy. How and why

certain PQOs became aligned with these varying actors is a question that bears further
examination since these alliances would greatly affect the future of the PQM. A
discussion of MM&Z’s third and final frame, the political opportunities and constraints
that shaped PQ actions and behaviors, will be necessary in order to explain how these
relationships were constructed, the roles they played in mediating state-piquetero
relations, and their impact on inter-organizational dynamics.

4.6 Piquetero Development and Political Opportunities/ Constraints

In Chapter 3 I outlined some of the political events that characterized the few
years preceding the 2001 peso crisis and some of the crisis’ immediate political effects.
There I mentioned how a slow economy and the rising social costs of the Menem

administration’s economic policies had caused a decline in the Peronist Party’s
popularity. The Radical Party was thus able to claim the presidency in the following
Presidential elections, but found itself unable to turn the country around as a result of a
the nation’s continued economic decline, divided legislature, and increased pressure from
middle and lower class citizens for social assistance. The end result of these events was a

political vacuum within the national government due to the Radical party government’s
lack of political and social capital to govern effectively. Gropus such as the PQM
consequently had an opportunity to fill this space by offering an alternative method of
political and social representation: protest. These events informed the “big picture”, or
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macro, processes that shaped Argentina’s national political context during this period and
thus influenced how the PQM oriented itself as a result of these circumstances.

This section, conversely, will explore how these macro processes shaped the
PQM on a smaller, micro scale. As I explained in Chapter 2, MM&Z’s idea of political
opportunities and constraints can be utilized on both a macro and micro level. Having
already investigated how these macro processes created certain opportunities for the
PQM, I will now turn my attention to the consequences Argentina’s political climate had
on the piquetero’s inter-movement dynamics. Specifically, how political context shaped

the relationship between PQOs and traditional political institutions and actors, and how
those relationships consequently affected the stratification of the PQM.

To this point I have talked a lot about the PQOs that compose the PQM in terms
of their cohesiveness as a movement and the organizational and structural similarities that
bind these groups together as a whole. And while these groups do share many traits that
unify them under the umbrella of the PQM, there are also important differences between
PQOs that divide the movement into competing factions. These differences stem

principally from the different connections individual PQOs have formed with traditional
political institutions and actors and the different relationships with the national
government that these connections have fostered.

The large majority of PQOs within the PQM fall into three categories based upon
their connections (or lack thereof) to these political actors: 1) those organizations

associated with the Argentine Workers Central (CTA). The CTA is a labor confederation
formed in 1991 from dissenting factions within the CGT, Argentina’s national labor
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union that has historically been closely tied to the Peronist party. The CTA was created
“in 1992 to organize fragmented struggles against unemployment and for welfare
provisions and to integrate the unemployed and those who were technically "socially
excluded.”*° Two of the largest and best known PQOs that the CTA has integrated into its
organization are the Land and Housing Federation (Federacion Tierra y Vivienda, FTV)
and the Classist Combative Current (Corriente Combativa Clasista, CCC). 2) PQOs
associated with El Bloque Piquetero Nacional (National Piquetero Block), an
organization comprised of groups closely linked to left political parties. These groups,
such as the Territorial Liberation Movement (Movimiento Teritorial de Liberacion,
MTL), believe that Argentina entered a revolutionary situation as a result of the
December 2001 crisis.*° 3) Groups that formed locally and independently from labor and

political organizations and continue to stress the importance of maintaining the
movement’s autonomy, independent of elite political influences. In summary, one could

say that the PQOs of the PQM orientated themselves along three poles of political
association: organized labor, the political left, and the independents.
How did these specific political poles form? In their article on the connections
between the MTL and Argentina’s Communist Party, Isabella Alcafiiz and Melissa Scheir
suggest that the presence (or absence) of piquetero coalitions with labor or political
organizations was a result of “pre-existing partisan networks linking unemployed workers

* Dinerstein, Ana C. "Power or Counter Power: The Dilemma of the Piquetero
Movement in Argentina post-crisis." Capital & Class 81 (2003): 1-8. Academic
Search Premier. Web. 14 Oct. 2009.
<http://Osearch.ebscohost.com.umiss.lib.olemiss.edu/login.aspx?
a
direct=true&db=aph&AN=1 1534340&site=ehost-live&scope=site>.
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to institutional political forces.”*” In this article, Alcafiiz and Scheir argue that, in the

case of the MTL and the Argentine Communist Party, political coalitions were created as
aresult of pre-existing social and organizational links that opposition organizations, such
as the Communist party (CP), possessed among the poor and unemployed.

Following the

2001 crash, opposition organizations, such as the CP, possessed resources (e.g. financial

assistance, political connections, and organizational experience) that would be attractive
to piquetero groups looking for ways to broaden the scope of their activities and extract

government assistance. Thus, utilizing pre-existing networks that the party had
established via its involvement in labor struggles in the years preceding December 2001,
the CP was able to establish ties with those piquetero groups that fell within the regional
areas in which those pre-existing networks were strongest.
I would argue that Alcafiiz and Scheir’s logic could be extended to the whole of
the PQM.

The formation (or at least the likelihood of formation) of coalitions between

PQOs and certain labor/political organizations could thus be explained in terms of the

pre-existing relationships and connections these organizations possessed within the
barrios of Buenos Aires and the possible resources these organizations could offer to
PQOs. To talk in terms of the three PQ political poles, those areas in which the CTA

and/or leftist political parties had strong pre-existing ties to the urban poor would thus be
more likely to embrace a partnership with these groups and accept the resources and
connections these groups had to offer. And thus, conversely, those areas in which these

7 Alcaiiiz, Isabella, and Melissa Scheier. "New Social Movements with Old Party
Politics: The MTL Piqueteros and the Communist Party in Argentina." Latin

American Social Movements in the Twenty-first Century: Resistance, Power, and
Democracy. Ed. Richard Stahler-Sholk, Glen David. Kuecker, and Harry E.
Vanden. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008, 273.
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organizations did not have a strong pre-existing presence would be more likely to

maintain their independence from these institutions. I do not suggest that the presence or
absence of these pre-existing networks in certain areas would inevitably produce groups
more or less open to creating coalitions; only to suggest a possible explanation as to why
certain PQOs might consider aligning themselves with these groups in some areas while
not in others.
The presence or absence of these coalitions would prove to be an important issue
within the PQM because these “social networks [shaped] the way the unemployed

understood their political context and developed political strategies.”** The influence of
these alternative organizations would thus lead to a diversity of political discourses and

expectations within the three aforementioned poles; subsequently leading to a divergence
within the PQM as to how each group approached its interactions with the government.
To demonstrate this process, I will once again return to the example of the MTL
and its relationship with the CP. According to Alcafiiz and Scheier, “the central tenets of
the MTL piquetero identity were rejection of neoliberal capitalism...distrust of the
traditional institutions of interest aggregation (state, party, and union politics) dominated
by Peronism, and a revolutionary interpretation of the events of December 2001.”*" Of
these first two tenets (rejection of neoliberal capitalism and a distrust of traditional
institutions), one could say that these were characteristic of all PQOs to a certain degree.
But what distinguishes the MTL from the other two political poles within the PQM, and
what would greatly shape the trajectory of the MTL, and those PQOs closely aligned with
it, was its revolutionary interpretation of the events of 2001. And according to Alcafiiz

88 Alcafiiz, 275.
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and Scheier’s, this position was directly informed by an understanding of the national

political context as influenced by the Communist party.” This revolutionary
interpretation would subsequently affect the MTL’s attitudes toward and interactions with
the government. If, as the MTL believed, Argentina was indeed in a pre-revolutionary
state, protests’ efforts and goals should not be geared towards the reformation of the
current political system, but rather towards engineering its downfall. This line of
thinking made the MTL, and other PQOs like its, less likely to negotiate or compromise
with the national government compared to those affiliated with the CTA or those who
chose to remain independent.
A political continuum of sorts was consequently established among PQOs
according to which political pole they belonged. The CTA was well versed in state-labor
negotiations, as a result of its previous associations with the CGT and its previous
interactions with the government over the previous decade. The CTA was thus far less
radical in its political discourse and expectations for political reform; its more vertical
organizational structure also being more conducive to working within and through the
current political system to extract the resources they wanted from the government. Those
further along the continuum, such as those who maintained their independence from any
formal political/labor organization, were far more wary of the possibility of political

cooptation and more forward in their call for political change; PQOs connected to the
Bloque Piquetero even more so. These last two groups were thus less likely to cooperate
with state institutions, calling for continued action as opposed to tempering their protests
in exchange for government subsidies.

” Ibid
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The effect of these distinct political approaches is such that the Bloque Piquetero,
with 90,000 members, is said to control only 10,000 government subsidies. In contrast,
the CTA affiliated FTV and CCC (120,000 and 80,000 members) are said to control

75,000 and 40,000 subsidies respectively.”' As I said in a previous section, one of (if not
the) most important mechanisms that drove PQO growth (if only in influence and

visibility if not in actual members) was an organization’s ability to win government
planes. For those PQO associated with more radical groups such as the Bloque
Piquetero, this became a difficult task despite its large membership numbers, as
evidenced by the distribution numbers of government subsidies. Since government

subsides functioned as the most important form of political and economic capital the
PQM possessed (both in terms of inter-movement PQO competition for potential
members and as a reflection of a PQO’s rapport with the national government), the

unequal distribution of p/anes meant an unequal distribution of political influence and
visibility within the PQM itself. Politically moderate organizations, like the FTV and
CCC, were thus advantaged over more politically exigent PQOs in both material and
political resources because of their cooperation.”

As a result, these PQOs and their CTA

affiliates came to dominate much of the public discourse within the PQM.

Contrastingly,

the more radical extremes of the political continuum were pushed to the margins of the
movement, limiting their material resources as well as their political exposure.
In the political stratification of the PQM during this period, we see the impact that
the nation’s larger, macro political processes had on the inter-movement development of

individual PQOs. Macro political process (increased visibility of government corruption,

| Alcafiiz, 279.
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a

ine rising social costs of Menem’s economic reform, and the new Radical party
avernment’S incapability to alter the nation’s socio-economic trajectory) eroded the
ore dibility of political traditional institutions and actors in the eyes of the public. Asa

result, these sentiments would preclude the possibility that popular grievances could be

addressed via traditional state-society channels (i.e. organizations, such as the CGT, that
had served as the working class’s political voice in the past). The breakdown of these
state-society channels would leave room for alternative groups (e.g. CTA, Bloque
Piqutero) to take advantage of the political vacuum. The resulting coalitions these groups

formed divided the PQM into competing political poles, stratified these poles according
to each pole’s relationship with the state, and allowed the more moderate PQOs to rise to
preeminence within the PQM.

However, the rise of CTA affiliated PQOs within the

internal hierarchy of the PQM did not create a more focused and effective movement.

In

fact, it produced quite the opposite effect. This lack of political solidarity within the PQM
ultimately allowed the state to reassert its power by rewarding those PQOs with more

moderate political aspirations with additional government assistance; while prejudicing
those organizations that pushed for stronger political reform.
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CONCLUSION

As I mentioned at the beginning of this investigation, when I first started
investigating the PQM and thinking about the kind of topics and questions I wanted
address over the course of this thesis, two questions seemed to hold my attention. First, I
was curious as to how the urban poor of Argentina had managed to mount such a massive
campaign considering the lack of resources that were available to them. What perfect
storm of events had made such an undertaking possible for a group that had so easily
been coerced and/or manipulated by party politics and politicians over the past several
decades? This was a question of development strategies. And to this end I began to

investigate how social scientists have attempted to analyze the processes that make
movements, such as the piqueteros, possible. By way of this investigation, I began to
explore the theoretical mechanisms and structures that form the skeleton of our
understanding of social movement mobilization and development.

Answering my

question thus became a manner of appropriating the suitable theoretical framework and
comparing these theoretical models with the PQM experience. For that reason, many
pages have been used over the course of this investigation to define, explain, and apply
these theoretical ideas to the PQM story in the hope of understanding the variables and
processes that were involved in its birth, organization, methods, and growth.
The second question that piqued my interest, however, was one of the
movement’s national contexts. The piqueteros emerged in a time of tremendous political

and economic transition in Argentina’s history. Only a short time after the fall of the
dictatorship that had so closely regulated Argentina’s political and economic spheres
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during the 1980s, the country was trying adjusting to a newly restored democracy and a
swift transition in terms of its economic development strategies. The PQM appeared in
the midst of these two key changes and in many ways its influence would seem

exaggerated by the instability that they produced. Consequently, one of my central
research topics was concerned with exploring how Argentina’s national context might
have influenced, or even generated the PQM? And in such a case, what might the
piqueteros have to tell us about SM mobilization in Latin America in the midst of these
transitional contexts?
As I near the end of my investigation it now seems appropriate to consider how
what has been discussed concerning the piqueteros might enlarge our understanding of
social movements in regards to these two areas of investigation. Through my research, I
hope to have provided sufficient evidence that the PQ’s do indeed bring something new

to the table. This section will consequently be used to expound upon how the PQM
offers a new perspective on traditional theoretical frames used to study Latin American
SMs mobilization.

A New Theoretical Perspective

In terms of a theoretical contribution, the piqueteros serve as a good example of
what MM&Z call “transgressive political contention.””’ Transgressive political
contention refers to broad collective action within a society in which at least some groups
that are party to the action are either a) new political actors or b) employ innovative

3 MMZ, 7.
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collective action’. As I suggested at the outset and have proven over the course of the

previous chapters, the piquetero movement fits this description on both counts.
One contribution of the piquetero movement was its utilization of the corte de
ruta as a powerful new means of popular protest. Though this style of protest did not
originate with the piqueteros, the piqueteros were the first to demonstrate its power and
effectiveness when coordinated on a large scale. Moreover, the corte de ruta served as a
powerful tool, both symbolically and logistically, in the hands of the piqueteros. The

roadblocks served the practical purpose of disrupting national commerce and trade in an
effort to extract concessions from the government; but also as a symbolic means by
which piqueteros could protest the policies of unbridled economic development that had

debilitated the country in the first place.
More importantly, however, in terms of a theoretical contribution, the PQM

introduced new actors in the form of the empowered urban poor. The traditional urban
peasantry that occupied the outer cordones surround Buenos Aires was largely
unemployed, uneducated, and lacking in access to basic social services. As a result, these
individuals were completely reliant upon state social assistance. Since the urban poor
lacked the social networks, financial resources, job skills, and political connections to reintegrate themselves into the national economy or effectively voice their needs, they were
forced to turn to alternative methods of representation. And in doing so they were not
only able to voice their grievances, they were able to capture the attention of the national
government by successfully demanding resources (albeit insufficient resources) and

assistance from the government. This is one of the novelties of the piquetero story — they

4 MMZ, 7-8.
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have realized the effective mobilization of a people group that had heretofore remained
isolated from each other and from contentions political action.

However, though the

PQM feigns to dispel the notion of the atomized poor, I have also shown that many of the
mechanism PQOs employed were only made possible by the convergence of numerous

political, social, and economic processes over which piqueteros had no control.
The obstacles that have always hindered SMs among the traditional poor were
still present, and were only overcome by assistance from outside actors, namely the state.
Menem’s economic reform policies provided the necessary economic strain for piquetero
mobilization. Government resources, such as subsidies and planes, provided the

mobilization mechanisms PQOs needed in order to continue growing their operations.
And even as PQOs used the threat of piquetes and cortes to extract additional state
resources, these handouts only served to re-establish state influence over the PQM in the
long run by rewarding those PQOs who were most willing to cooperate with the
government; pushing those who had hoped for deeper and more profound political and
economic change to the outskirts of political and economic influence.
Piquetero mobilization was rather a result of the congruence of several key
external conditions that dismantled and/or immobilized state controls over the urban
poor. The consequences of Menem’s reform on the national economy sufficiently
paralyzed the patronage networks that had heretofore kept the lower class contented and
dependent upon government aid for their livelihood. The state’s eroding political
legitimacy and instability would give rise to alternative forms of social representation,
such as PQOs.

And the rising social costs of economic reform would increasingly

stratify Argentine society, leading to the impoverishment of much of the middles class,
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consequently bolstering national support for protest organizations and increasing

participation in collective action.
The timely congruence of so many variables does not suggest that such success
could be easily repeated. And though we cannot consider the PQM to be truly
revolutionary in the sense that it was a self-sufficient movement of the urban poor;

Argentina’s social, economic, and political conditions provided the piqueteros, for a time,
a narrow window of opportunity in which these new actors were given a platform from
which they could influence national institutions.

Rethinking National Contexts

In addition to its theoretical contributions, the PQM also provides us a new
perspective on SMs in regards to their interaction with national and regional contexts. By
this I mean that by looking at the historical, political, and economic strains that produced
the PQM we can see a deviation from previous patterns of Latin American SMs. History
seems to suggest a series of recurring strains that have often spawned SM within LA
nations such as struggles over land distribution, ethnic tensions, democratic transitions,
and labor struggles to name a few. The root of these strains lies in the political,
economic, and social imbalances that many LA nations have had to deal with over the
past century. In light of Argentina’s experience during the 1990s and 2000s and
emergence of the PQM, I would like to add one more category to the list of strains:
strains of economic development.
The novelty of the PQM’s context is based upon the idea that the PQM was
derived from strains associated with Argentina's economic development and
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modernization.

Social strains produced by economic hardship are not a new phenomenon

in LA nations. However, the PQs offer a unique perspective in that the boundaries and
contexts in which these economic strains developed and the nature of the response to

these strains are different. First, the context is that of the economic development within
what most would call a modern industrialized nation. As the world economy continues to
become more and more fluid, more and more LA nations will be looking for effective
economic models upon which they can build economic policy. In Argentina’s case,

officials looked towards the neoliberal economic model as a possible solution. This
approach differs from Argentina’s trajectory over the past fifty years in that previous
development efforts focused on ISI strategies, an emphasis on self-sufficiency, and a
turing inward towards domestic markets. In the 1990s, however, the Argentine
government fully embraced the capitalist economic model without reserve, and though
the results were decidedly mixed, the abrupt change brought new challenges to the
dynamic of state-society relations.

The strains caused by development initiatives within a global, free-market system
are thus a new challenge that many LA nations will have to face. Many are facing it right
now, yet they have not all suffered as Argentina.

Argentina is well known for being the

exception to the rule in many areas and in many ways represents the extreme experiences
of certain phenomena. This is certainly true in the case of its attempts at economic
development. Countries such as Brazil and Chile have adopted many of the same
economic philosophies that Menem adopted during the 1990s, yet they have not suffered

as Argentina. The novelty of the strain caused by economic development seems limited
to the Argentina's specific national context.
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However, the PQM offers us a unique perspective on the interaction between SMs
and their national contexts not only in terms of the origin of the conflict (neoliberal

economic policies), but also in nature of the popular response to these strains. The PQM
offers a unique perspective on collective action in that protesters, who were first
mobilized in response to locally limited socio-economic strains, broadened the scope of
their protests to challenge the logic behind an entire economic system. One of the central

dilemmas behind the creation of the PQM is the question of how societies balance the
opposing forces of economic growth and social equality. The piqueteros, by virtue of
identifying their hardships as a product of the capitalist system, rather than just bad
government policy, began questioning the traditional logic (such as the neoliberal model
set out by the IMF) behind economic development.
Piqueteros (at least on a discursive or ideological level) became a movement
concemed with the idea of equitable growth, as much social as economic. They saw the

Menem administration’s efforts to promote one type of growth over the other (economic
over social) as a breach of the state-society contract in which the government had
traditionally functioned as a guarantor of economic and social opportunities. The
government’s subsequent abandonment of its social obligations and the inequalities that
were produced as a result consequently fueled the mobilization of the lower classes.

The broader implications of the PQM experience thus lie in its possible
application to other Latin American nations where similar state-society contracts exist.
This question of socially equitable growth is one that faces all nations. Yet I would argue

that in Latin American nations this question is particularly poignant because of the large
role state institutions have often played in providing social and economic assistance to
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